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The major purpose of this study is to offer an explana­
tion of an aesthetic theory of knowledge as well as to 
illustrate the usefulness of aesthetics as a lens for exam­
ining issues in educational theory. 
Arising from the belief that man is essentially spirit, 
and that he has a will or directing force within that makes 
him intentionally purposeful, the study attempts to examine 
that spiritual definition in ethical terms, that is, in 
terms of what constitutes intelligent and authentic choice. 
Three questions arise from such a definition! what comprises 
man's artistic capacities, what is the role of the imagina­
tion in perception and cognition, and what are appropriate 
criteria of judgment with which to evaluate educational deci­
sions. These questions are addressed in the three parts of 
the paper. 
Part One attempts to clarify the term humanness. Draw­
ing from the writings of Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Buber, 
the human being emerges as a meaning-seeking creature who 
makes choices on the basis of both logic and intuition, rea­
son and imagination. Since each choice has within it the 
stance of doubt, the impossibility of absolute knowledge, 
there needs to be a frame of reference in which to evaluate 
those choices. Such a frame is found in Buber's conception 
of dialogue. Through the human interaction of dialogue, 
knowledge takes on a constructive nature and therefore must 
be evaluated within a moral context* 
Part Two advances an epistemology based upon Part One's 
definition of being human. Focusing on the constructive 
nature of knowing, it explores the connections made between 
the uses of the imagination and our systems of knowledge as 
well as our perception, cognition, and evaluation of that 
knowledge. Not only is the imagination conceived of as 
essential to our epistemological functions, but it is also 
argued that, because the imagination renders the world prob­
lematic, it results in the existential necessity of living 
critically and the aesthetic responsibility of judging auth­
entically. 
Part Three traces the aesthetic, existential thread 
through three dimensions of schooling! time, space, and 
language. Drawing on the works of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, 
and examples of twentieth-century art and literature, this 
part focuses on the temporal nature of our existence, the 
necessity of the existential presence, and the role that 
time, place, and language play in obtaining that presence. 
Concluding that individual as well as historical context 
affect the learning process, it is argued that curricular 
decisions must take into account both the critical presence 
of the individual and the contextual nature of that indivi­
dual's existence. 
Because emphasis is upon the constructive nature of the 
learning process, the mode of inquiry is an interpretative 
one. Essential to such research was finding a method of 
distancing, a way of viewing this personal, social history 
critically. To fulfill this need, a critical, phenomenologi-
cal approach was used* Reflecting upon personal response 
allowed for an assumption of individual responsibility as 
well as an awareness of the ethical situations in which 
those responsibilities rest. 
The study concludes that the aesthetic/spiritual frame­
work provides a valuable way of looking at our educational 
processes. Calling for the subjective presence of the indi­
vidual making educational decisions, an awareness of the his­
torical perspective out of which these decisions come, and 
the need for a qualitative mode of inquiry into educational 
processes, it has intellectual, emotional, and social impli­
cations for future educational decisions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The following is an attempt to present an alternative 
framework for viewing education. The framework rests on the 
belief that the human being intends to mean, that he does 
interpret life and he does create meanings within the con­
text of his world. Calling for the education of the imagi­
native, intuitive side of our being that allows us to create 
meaning structures, it acknowledges that the world is 
possibility. At the same time, calling for a critical eval­
uation of those meaning structures, it demands responsibil­
ity. Because meaning is a human function, then the sense in 
which it must be judged is a moral sense. We- have to ask 
what does it say about our being human and how does it 
diminish or enlarge us all? 
Maxine Greemhas described such a view of education as 
opening windows in the actual. Quoting an artist, Dr. 
Greene says that an artist does not point to a rock that is 
there and say see the rock. He pulls the rock in and makes 
it there. By his skill and magic, he makes that rock occupy 
space on a canvas that it didn't before. The point is, if 
you can make things occupy space that they didn't before 
have, you then have possibility and the ability to envision 
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many futures.3- In a sense, that is what this paper is 
about, opening windows to possibility, giving educators a 
new way of looking into the world. 
The model for the framework is the aesthetic encounter. 
Taking us out of worlds which we ordinarily know, it is the 
aesthetic encounter that gives us a counter image off of 
which to view our life situations. In this sense, it both 
opens up possibility and gives us a form for critically 
assessing ourselves and the world in which we live. 
Beginning with the person in the process of coming to 
know, the aesthetic encounter is an intuitive process of 
understanding as well as a logical process of interpreting 
that understanding. The art object itself is metaphor, a 
naming of what the world might be. Compressed within its 
space are associations, implications, multiple meanings 
that both communicate, but at the same time remain open, in­
exhaustible, demanding that the viewer complete the meaning 
with his own intentions, his own set of assumptions. 
Pulled into the object, we reflect upon that object as well 
as upon ourselves, how we perceive the object. Moving back 
and forth in this dialogical process, we interpret a phenome­
non in light of who we are and also interpret ourselves in 
terms of that phenomenon. Because of this dialogue we have 
•4/laxine Greene, "Moving Toward Open Possibility," 
paper presented at Ethel Martus Lawther Lecture, University 
of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, N.C., 20 
November 1980. 
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new knowledge about the world and about ourselves in the 
world. The rock occupies a spaoe that it didn't before. 
Thus the rock, as well as the self that perceives that 
rock, takes on new meaning, a new frame of reference. No 
longer is the rock something separate from us but something 
inevitably bound to us. We have a stake in the world and 
thus the responsibility to look at that world from a moral 
perspective. 
The essential character of this aesthetic process is 
therefore imagination. Being a key element in our aware­
ness of the world, it is the imagination that enables us to 
engage in this aesthetic dialogue. Allowing us to construct 
knowledge and interpret metaphors in terms of what it means 
to be human, it is the imagination that brings value and 
significance to our world. 
Mary Warnock has explained that the imagination, 
because it names things as familiar, gives to those things 
meaning and value. At the same time, the imagination, be­
cause it opens up possibilities, allows us to mold experi­
ence into something new. Because it is therefore incomplete, 
inexhaustible, it allows us to see that we can't name all 
things. In other words, there is more to life than we can 
predict and. therefore, there is reason to continue. Life 
has significance because it involves our existential 
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participation.1 This giving of value and significance to 
the world is not only what enables us to translate mere 
sensations into intelligible thought, but also is what 
makes the world colorful. 
Therefore, the creation of an Imaginative framework for 
viewing education requires a different mode of inquiry* 
Because the imagination brings color to the black-and-white 
of our world, it is difficult to categorise it and put it 
in black-and-white terms. Because of the imagination, man 
has a conscious-making capacity* He constructs the world 
as he moves through it* Meaning is found in contextual 
interpretations and therefore depends upon intentionality, 
awareness, sensitivity, and the responsibility of the indi­
vidual in the context of his life. To systematize or cate­
gorize , to put man in one set of data or another set, reduces 
him to a collective statistic, an impersonal entity. Void 
of his intentionality and uniqueness, he is made to func­
tion apart from the complex situations in which he is im­
bedded. Because the statistical model assumes the world is 
ordered and rational, an ultimate pattern will even­
tually be found. Behaviors are thus noted, results quanti­
fied, and probabilities estimated. What is lost in the pro­
cess is the sense that the world is not ordered but varie-
it 
gated. Because the individual brings to each situation his 
iMary Warnock, Imagination (Berkeley, Californiai Uni­
versity of California Press, 1978), pp. 196-202. 
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own set of terms and his own needs, there exist multiple 
orders. Thus* to base knowledge on statistical regulari­
ties is to divorce evidence from the source of that evi­
dence, man as participant from the world in which he 
participates.! 
All of which is not to say that statistical research 
is invalid. It is to say that, in this case, it is not 
appropriate. In that statistics provides us with informa­
tion concerning the many variables that influence learning, 
it broadens our awareness, and is appropriate* Information 
that indicates that cognitive development proceeds in 
stages is useful when considering the concrete or abstract 
nature of the material we present to children. In giving 
us a different set of information, it gives us a different 
focus from that which we would perhaps ordinarily take. 
If, however, statistics is to account for understand­
ing, it is not appropriate. Because understanding involves 
interpretation, imagination, the thinker in the context of 
his own life, it is not a collective process but an 
individual one. The conscious-making capacity of man 
depends upon that thinker, his or her unique horizon, which 
Icarmelo Albert Rubio, "An Interpretative Inquiry Into 
the World of the Teacher" (Ed.D. dissertation, University 
of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1979)» pp» 63-75. 
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the rationality of statistics leaves out.1 And, if it is 
the conscious-making capacity of man that we are attempting 
to understand, then the question to ask is not what are the 
behaviors displayed, that is, how do we identify behavior 
that is imaginative and externally verify it apart from 
contexti the question to be asked is what is the quality 
underlying the behavior, how does the imagination work in­
wardly, within the context of the individual life? 
It is in this sense that the following is itself an 
imaginative look at education. The belief is that if we 
are to examine the imaginative process of interpreting and 
creating meaning, then it is necessary that the individual 
herself participate imaginatively in that inquiry. In other 
words, if we are to understand understanding, then it is 
necessary that the individual critically examine her mean­
ings, her interpretations. If she is to re-envision what 
this is all about, then it is necessary that she make the 
givens problematic, that she step outside the world in which 
she is immersed and consciously reflect upon it. That re­
quires imagination. The intent is not only to re-examine 
my set of assumptions, my values, in a way that will allow 
me to grow both creatively and intellectually, but also to 
present a vivid, imaginative description of educational life 
1James B. Macdonald, "Theory-Practice and the Herme-
neutic Circle," paper presented at Curriculum Theory Con­
ference, Airlie, Virginia, 28 October 1980. 
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that will allow the reader to transcend the situations in 
which he is immersed and enter into it aesthetically, to 
see possibilities for his own life. 
An imaginative mode of research, while being neither 
philosophical nor historical, nevertheless draws from both 
models for its methodology. Philosophical, interpretative 
research is an attempt to look at the theories that support 
our belief system and that are therefore the foundation 
upon which we act. Believing that thought and action can 
not be separated (if they are, then some actions are thought­
ful and some thoughtless, yet all contain thought), the pur­
pose of philosophical research is to re-determine and re­
develop the theories out of which ultimately all our actions 
arise. The concern here has therefore not been with assess­
ing curricular objects through comparison and contrast, but 
with assessing my reactions to those objects, my critical 
appreciation of them. The question was not whether art 
should have priority over math, but what did art mean, what 
did math mean? What were the basic assumptions underlying 
our teaching of those disciplines? 
Inherent in such a mode of looking was the problem 
that those theories which I was attempting to examine were 
the foundation upon which that examination was done. The fear is 
ever present that what I have done is simply reiterate the 
set of beliefs I came with. It is difficult to examine what 
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we believe because we see everything through that belief.* 
We look at the world through a certain kind of lens and no 
matter how many times we change that frame, the lens remains 
with us. Thus, we create a whole category to go with the 
beliefs and what we see is self-fulfilling. 
And yet, there is a validity in assessing one's reac­
tions. Concepts, rather than being isolated and then com­
pared, are given a context in which to work. Enmeshed in 
the time and place of the speaker, these concepts demand 
interpretation through that speaker. They demand direct 
involvement of how one thinks and feels. Because the obser­
ver is an integral part of the creation of any knowledge, he 
is forced to focus upon the ethical nature of his acts. 
Because he cannot deal with the world once removed, he must 
join in a relationship with that world. Therefore, he must 
make a commitment to be in the world and to assume responsi­
bility for that being. What is at stake here is not a 
catharsis-like handling of educational issues in which prob­
lems are traced to a single cause and then gotten rid of. 
What is at stake is a belief system out of which issues come. 
To examine that belief is to open oneself to new beliefs. 
What I have done here is moral inquiry, a re-examination 
of life as lived. Therefore, the inquiry called for an 
Ŵilliam Barrett, The Illusion of Technique (Garden 
City, New Yorki Doubleday Company; Anchor Press, 1978), p. 
238. 
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historical interpretation of that life. The outline for 
what I wrote was many years in the inception. Derived from 
childhood memories, educational experiences, impressions 
and events, both significant and insignificant, it was era-
bedded in my historical past. To look historically, there­
fore, was to look for pattern, for trends. It was to look 
at the events, both significant and insignificant, that had 
persisted. Once those events were identified, it was neces­
sary to examine them in terms of not only the event, but 
also the people and the place in which they had occurred as 
well as in terms of the event, people, and place of the pres­
ent. What emerged were multiple time frames. The past was 
viewed from the standpoint of the present. The present was 
reflected upon in terras of the past. Because of the differ­
ing time frames, I was able to stand back, bracket situations, 
and consciously reflect upon them. By challenging the events 
that had simply happened to me, I was able to put them in a 
different light, to step out of being surrounded by them and 
uncover the taken-for-grantedness. In this sense, historical 
research presented me with different conceptions of time, 
space, and place. Because I was the only constant, I came 
to realize that what is is not necessarily what ought to be. 
Out of this historical dialogue emerged a new sense of 
presence and therefore of responsibility. 
Because the writing was historical, autobiographical in 
nature, there is a certain nonlinear quality in the 
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selection of events and presentation of those events. Con­
cepts aren't systematically presented and then criticized. 
The concepts are those selected from my life events which 
differ in content and order from the life events of others. 
Whether I have chosen those events which were qualitative or 
not, I do not know. Because they persisted, they were 
written about. Others, perhaps not so persistent, may never­
theless be of value. Herein lies the responsibility to con­
tinually bring forth the images of our lives for examination. 
The order in which these images are presented is not 
systematic in the sense that we usually know its a chrono­
logical or hierarchical collection of data which ultimately 
adds up to a whole, each piece therefore extractable. The 
whole was where I began, in the belief that the fundamental 
human quest is the search for meaning. Therefore, in this 
writing, chapter two is chapter three is chapter four. The 
basic theme is common to each) the focus is not. Each 
chapter repeats the other but, at the same time, elaborates 
on the other, giving dimension, depth, and breadth to the 
theme. In this sense, it is a piece and must be taken as a 
whole. 
Moving backward and forward in history, using shifting 
points of view, and depending upon metaphor to convey my 
meaning, the theme reveals itself in ever widening circles. 
Criticism is internal to that writing! interior and forever 
bound to the situation itself. To stand apart from Ford 
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Island and critically assess it calls forth the history of 
the event, the texture, the way it feels. It also calls 
for a .revaluation of the past and of the present, jux­
taposed, each examined for its intention- . . ' 
ality and awareness. It is this that gives it authenticity. 
Truth and meaning do not exist a priori but are constantly 
redetermined within the context. Evaluation, therefore, 
can only be done in terms of the event, not in terms of out­
side criteria. To the extent that it reveals an individual's 
growth, both critically and intuitively, it has integrity. 
To the extent that it demands the reader's imagination to 
complete that meaning, it has validity. 
To participate in an imaginative mode of inquiry re­
quires an exercise of the imagination, on the part of both 
the writer and the reader. To look at one's own responses 
and biases critically means that those situations out of 
which they came must be temporarily set up as other than 
ourselves and, at the same time, must be in dialogue with 
ourselves. It is as if we replay a movie and find within it 
new meanings because we find within ourselves new intention-
ality. This setting aside was made possible through the use 
of metaphors. Because metaphor allows us to insert order 
onto the chaos of our experiences, it gives us a frame of 
reference, a way to handle the material of our lives. At 
the same time, because metaphor is incomplete, because it 
can evoke many meanings, it forces us to examine that order. 
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Metaphors not only give us a way of viewing our lives, but 
they also elaborate on those lives. Therefore, the receiver 
of these metaphorical images, whether he be the one reading 
them or the one writing them, must complete their meaning 
with his own intentions and valuations. The problem is 
whether his imagination will be able to make those connec­
tions. The hope is that it will be required to again and 
again, that a life as lived will not go away, that it will 
reappear for constant examination and projection. 
The need to look at the educational process imaginative­
ly has been overwhelming, not just because of its theoreti­
cal implications, e.g., that to have critical consciousness 
about the world we must critically examine that world, but 
also because of its aesthetic implications. Implicit in any 
object of study is a tone, an atmosphere which itself 
becomes part of the content learned. The words we use, the 
examples we choose, the order in which we place the informa­
tion, all contribute to the information that is conveyed. 
Therefore, the tone here is one of imagining. Discovering 
resemblances between real and imagined things, mixing fact 
and fantasy, many of the conclusions come from my own mind 
but may not exist elsewhere. And yet, because they were 
constructed and because I was an integral part of that con­
struction, they exist as possibility, just as my life exists 
as possibility. Rather than capture thought, I have 
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attempted to provoke it. Therefore, the form of my life 
has become a content for that life.Because the mode of 
writing was itself a metaphor, it presents a critique of 
life without metaphor. 
Aesthetics is a way of looking at the world. To be 
present, it must permeate the fabric of that worldi the 
environment, materials, curriculum, teaching relationships, 
everything that goes on in our schools. Because it offers 
no rules of order, i.e., the rules are integral to the indi­
vidual living in the curriculum, we cannot demand responsi­
bility on the part of the student nor insure that he will 
make moral choices. Because morality belongs exclusively 
to the single human individual, we can but grant him 
responsibility and afford him opportunities for moral 
choice, at the same time doing all that we can to enhance 
his choosing by living ourselves in relation to the world 
and the people of the world. 
To believe that this is possible, in spite of the fears, 
in spite of the doubts, that is the thing. The spiritual 
realm must ultimately be taken on faith. 
iHerbert Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension (Bostoni 
Beacon Press, 1977)t pp. 41-42. ' 
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PART I 
THE STORYTELLER 
16 
CHAPTER I 
PROLOGUE 
We tell ourselves stories in order to live.l Life 
consists of a kaleidoscope of chaotic, disparate images 
which continually flow around us. Some of them we pluck 
out and insert into a narrative we already know. Others 
seem to have no connectors. Because the images are dispa­
rate and we cannot live with chaos, we make sense out of 
them by holding on to them—clarifying, criticizing, and 
interpreting. We insert a narrative line on them. 
The following is my narrative. It arose from a need 
to find reason and order, to clarify for myself where I was 
going so I could then find out how to get there. Somehow, 
they came to me, those students, in the fifteenth year of 
their lives and they left in the sixteenth year, their 
passage paid out with a letter grade. Yet, I longed to be 
with them through time, not to make my appearance in the . 
form of a letter grade. The problem was that we were a 
group of people gathered together in this place called 
school, who, because of our proximity, had the potential to 
add to as well as take away from each other's lives. How 
Ijoan Didion, The White Album (New Yorki Simon & 
Schuster, 1979)» p. 11. 
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to insure that we add to each other, that quality be 
brought to our being together, was my task. Thus began my 
quest for a story, a framework in which I could think about 
and talk about educational decisions within a moral/ 
aesthetic context. Ultimately, my motive became my method. 
To understand dialogue, I had to participate in dialogue. 
If influencing each other's lives in a moral way was 
what I was talking about, then I had to first open myself 
to being influenced. I could not deal with ideas and ex­
periences somewhere out there, as if they were recipe cards 
to be checked out of the library. To deal with knowledge in 
such a way was merely to rearrange it, to engage in doing, 
as if doing made up for not understanding. Instead, I had 
to open myself to influence, to make myself present to the 
ideas and knowledge that others brought me. It meant I 
brought the evidence of my life, my personal history, and 
reflected that evidence against the evidence of other's 
lives. Within this dialogical encounter, I gained another 
focus, another frame of mind with which to stand off and 
look at who I was, to peel away the layers of prejudice and 
taken-for-grantedness. 
S/rfren Kierkegaard, Fyodor Dostoevsky, and Martin Buber 
became the three men with whom I engaged in dialogue. Each 
of them spoke to a moral/aesthetic way of being and, in 
their speaking, they touched some tiling in me that opened my 
life to new interpretations. What they brought to me was 
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the realization that there was a subjective and construc­
tive nature of reality. It was therefore possible to cre­
ate evil as well as good. Furthermore, if good is what we 
are about, then we must always consider the social dimen­
sion in which we make our choices. 
And so the narrative evolved. I cannot lay single 
claim to it for it belongs to all of us. Yet, in the same 
way that dialogue demanded the self be present, so too did 
the interpretation of that dialogue. Without self, there 
was no interpretation, just repetition. What I have written 
then is personal and descriptive. That which has been heard 
has been filtered through my own history, my own life, and 
I must stand personally responsible, both for the questions 
I ask and the conclusions I draw. I am the storyteller 
through whom the ideas sift and have meaning. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE STORYTELLER 
A LOOK AT THINGS PAST 
I did not choose existentialism. It chose me. Time 
has obscured naming the moment of this choosing. Perhaps 
it wasn't a moment after all, but a sifting through of many 
moments, insignificant in themselves, an affirmation in 
their totality. Kant would say these moments were only 
manifestations of a priori truths making themselves known 
to met that somehow reality exists in and of itself and 
life is some impersonal domain where the I (me) tries to 
connect with the It (whatever the phenomena of the world 
really are). To Kant, I would reply* yes, these experi­
ences happened to me in a time before I went in search of 
them and in that sense they chose me. But it was I who 
chose to remember them. Out of all the possible millenia 
of moments through which I have moved, I chose a handful to 
be significant, to define who I am now and to give direction 
to who I may in the future be. I both chose and was chosen. 
Chapel Hill—1967—the administration building. 
Its facade is supported by massive gothic columns 
which are white and luminous. Its front walk is 
lined by National Guard troops carrying guns and 
wearing tear gas masks. It is as if strange, gro­
tesque, disfigured trees were planted on the land­
scape. I was late for an exam on the Romantic 
poets. 
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To be chosen means we move through many worlds, never 
wholly a part of one or of another, but some combination 
thereof. Many things happen to us before we go in search 
of them. Our sex, race, family composition, social circum­
stances are givens we inherit at birth. The givens bump 
up against other givens, the physical and institutional 
life that surrounds us, and in the interaction we are con­
tinually changed and modified, both because of the effect 
the environment has on us and because of the way we choose 
to react to that environment. These givens, some acknowl­
edged, some not, are the possibilities out of which we con­
struct our lives. That many of them come to us in a time 
before we go in search of them means that at any one point 
we are already equipped with a life as it has been lived. 
We have accumulated a body of knowledge and beliefs, many 
of which are in opposition. Because we have yet to choose, 
we operate according to many world views simultaneously. 
Within the medieval, two-dimensional world view, 
living was done horizontally, within a class. That class 
derived its vertical position directly from God. God was 
the authority, existing out there, and man was one of a 
class of beings. Each class was like a rung in a ladder, 
and to each rung or class there were assigned certain tasks. 
Serfs tilled the land. Nobility protected serfs. To do 
well within one's class or position was to be desired. 
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Under such a system, life was predictable. It had a begin­
ning, middle, and end* Man was but a point somewhere in a 
sequence. His goal was in terms of futures. Productive 
membership would result in an eternal reward. 
This two-dimensional world view is still very much a 
part of our living and is the source for many of our educa­
tional decisions. Authority is derived from above. Iden­
tity is found in group membership. We are defined by our 
intelligence quotient, our social class, our age group. 
Education, therefore, is a process of equipping us with an 
appropriate set of behaviors which will enable us to func­
tion adequately within our society. The aim of such educa­
tion is to produce classes of people whose goals and values 
are in terms of futures. "The end of education so conceived 
is productive membership."2 School is what prepares us for 
life, not a part of life. 
Perhaps we do not look elsewhere for authority nor 
question our social standing because such a world is comfor­
ting. Its ritual moves from beginning to middle to end 
with rewards at each stage. We trade off questioning in 
return for a guarantee of predictability. Like listening to 
a Bach concerto, we know what will come next. We know, if 
Iwilliam Barrett, Irrational Want A Study in Existen­
tial Philosophy (Garden City, New Yorki Doubleday & 
Company, 1962), pp. 24-54. 
2Maxine Greene, ed., Existential Encounters for Teach­
ers (New Yorki Random House, 1967), p. 158. " 
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we have learned our lessons, which notes follow which. 
Thus, while one note is being played, we anticipate the 
next. When that note is actually played, it is already in 
the past. The problem with living in futures, in anticipa­
tion of the next climax, is that we miss the unexpectedness 
of now. National Guard troops surrounded the administra­
tion building and I was descending a stair with "My Last 
Duchess."1 The juxtaposition is jarring. It cannot be 
covered up. It lies there and nags. 
East Berlin—1979. They said her eyes weren't 
blue. We would be detained. The colored contact 
lenses did not match the passport description. 
Existing simultaneously with this two-dimensional 
world view is a three-dimensional view, given birth with 
the advent of Science. Under the scientific paradigm, man 
turned outward into space,2 both the space of the sky and 
the space of the minute particles within. Thus, reality 
became less and less connected with self. The process of 
evolution determined which natural forms would survive. 
Empirical findings became indicators of truth, and logic 
and reasoning became the means whereby we might discover 
that truth. Kant had said that "there are two things in 
this universe worth noting, both the starry heavens above 
-̂Robert Browning, "My Last Duchess," in The Complete 
Poetic and Dramatic Works of Robert Browning, ed. Horace E. 
Scudder (Cambridge, Massi The Riverside Press, 1895). 
2Barrett, Irrational Man, p. 49. 
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and the moral law within.1,1 To many people, there was no 
moral law within, there was only the material fact of the 
stars. 
Under the scientific system, the authority of God was 
replaced by the authority of Science. Man was no longer a 
reflection of God's divine plan. He was an anonymous being, 
a figure to be examined and dissected and judged according 
to his rationality, according to the scientific laws where­
by all things operate. Because rationality led to organiza­
tion and productivity, the production of goods compensated 
"in their concreteness and immediacy for the loss of other 
worldly support and hopes for an afterlife.*2 
As a result of tiie scientific movement, many educa­
tional ideas and programs changed rapidly. Only that which 
was empirically verifiable was true. Therefore, learning 
theories, studies of child development, teaching methodolo­
gy, and measurement techniques were designed and evaluated 
according to behavioral objectives.3 Because rationality 
meant order, sequence, and logic, efficiency was given 
priority. Because technical achievements represented mas­
tery over our world, they were valued. Ethics and morality 
3-Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason* trans. Norman 
Kemp Smith (Londont Macmillan & Co., 1963)t P* 642. 
2Greene, Existential Encounters, p. 10. 
3srian V. Hill, Education and the Endangered Indivi­
dual! A Critique of Ten Modern Thinkers (New Yorki Dell 
Publishing Company, 1973)» P« 17* 
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were but speculative concerns and were therefore left to 
chance. 
The problem with three-dimensional worlds is their 
super clarity. They exist somewhere out there, perfect, 
simple, and well made—an abstraction. Life, however, is 
not an abstraction. It is complex, confusing, and ambi­
guous . 
Perhaps we still cling to this world view because the 
American dream sustains us. The sheer optimism that this is 
the best of all possible worlds and that our methodology of 
reason will forever open new horizons for us to explore is 
the trade-off for not questioning what man has done in the 
name of sciencet turned it into technology, groomed a whole 
generation of people for a kind and level of consumption, 
and made of the people a specimen, an object for study and 
use. We trade off our freedom in the name of an "abstract 
vision of a free, perfectible, rational man."* 
We tell ourselves stories in order to live. In East 
Berlin that day, a young girl, just out of graduate school, 
believed in the perfectibility of the American dream, until 
life and finitude intruded upon that dream. 
I saw a man pursuing the horizon) 
Round and round they sped. 
I was disturbed at this; 
I accosted the man. 
Ĝreene, Existential Encounters, p. 16. 
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"It is futile," I said, 
"You can never " 
"You lie," he cried, 
And ran on. 
Stephen Crane, 
"I Saw a Man Pursuing the Horizon"1 
A faceless and anonymous figure who is at once every man 
and nobody.̂  
It is through this jarring of the day by day that exis­
tentialism came to me. While the moments may seem insigni­
ficant in themselves, because we are, after all, on our way 
from one place to another, they cannot be ignored. They are 
encounters in which time is made present to us. And, 
because time was made present to me, I must speak about it. 
The gap that exists between what is and what could be must 
be acknowledged. 
The following then is my story, a record of my inquiry. 
It is both a statement and an acknowledgement. As an inqui­
rer, I push hope against fear. I construct possibilities. 
The phenomena of the world are as the sands at the beach 
that stretch flat, cold, and impersonal, waiting for the 
human touch to give them life. I reach out to explore with 
all my senses$ taste, touch, feel, and I see shapes emerge— 
a sand castle, its turrets tall, dripped one upon another, 
3-The Complete Poems of Stephen Crane, ed. Joseph Katz 
(Ithaca, New Yorki Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 26. 
2Barrett, Irrational Man, p. 61. 
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fat structures, skinny structures, limited only by the 
imagination. Because I seek to create, it is created. Be­
cause I seek to touch the world, a world is made possible 
which can be touched. Yet, it is always temporary, this 
sand castle* With each wave comes a new pattern, and 
another, until the last one recedes and only the flat, cold 
sand stretches once more, its grey-brown surface like a 
blank page, awaiting new words, new castles. It is as if 
there is no finality, only continuations, processes of 
clarification and illumination and, of course, yearnings of 
the imagination, longings for creation. 
At the same time my creation is a statement, it is also 
an acknowledgement that the experience and perspective of 
others are the resources for this creation. It is others 
who speak to me of new worlds, new interpretations, new 
realms of meaning. It is others who must break my shell of 
conformity and help move me to a critical stance. It is 
they who pose the questions that lead beyond the familiar, 
beyond the self-evident. 
I sit now by the window, the snow sifts down through 
the blackened branches of the old oak trees, and the only 
sound is Robert Frost's "sweep / Of easy wind and downy 
flakeand in some way I am touched by the scene. It is as 
"Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening," in The Poetry 
of Robert Frost, ed. Edward Connery Lathem (New Yorki Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1969)1 lines 11-12, p. 224. 
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if for a moment, I am all that exists in the world of neat 
brick houses and tree-lined streets. Yet, only because 
others exist am I able to feel the moment, to know what my 
aloneness m#ans. Eileen is in her kitchen across the street. 
She sits alone, drinking a cup of coffee, and she does not 
see what Emerson in "The Snow Storm" called "the mad wind's 
nightwork."* For her, there is only Robert Frost's lines 
from "A Patch of Old Snow," That I should have guessed / 
Was a blown-away paper the rain / Had brought to rest."2 
She does not choose to see what I see. Yet, Eileen will 
speak to me later of Dostoevsky's yellow snow incessantly 
falling in a twilight that never ceases, and we will share 
a new insight. As new interpretations emerge, we both move 
beyond the moment's emotion. We recognize, as Merleau-Ponty 
said, that with each new birth, "the world gains a fresh 
layer of meaning."3 
Existentialism had come to me through the cracks and 
crevices of the world I had been born into. Little pieces 
had gotten through the armor and made themselves present. 
And so began my quest. I was Stepheni Crane's faceless and 
3-The Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. 
Brooks Atkinson (New YorkV 'The Modern Library, 196*0, line 
27. p. 768. 
2The Poetry of Robert Frost, lines 2-k ,  p. 110. 
Quoted in Pat F. Carini, Observation and Description 
Grand Forks, North Dakota» University of North Dakota 
Press, 1976), p. ̂ 5. 
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anonymous figure pursuing the horizon of education and it 
was to the existentialists, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and 
Buber, that I turned for illumination and clarification. 
Existentialism 
Existentialism itself is neither an idea nor a system 
of thought. Concerned with the unique experience of the 
single individual struggling to find meaning, it does not so 
much talk about life as it re-presents life, recasting the 
meaning of life in relation to the individual. 
Science had indicated that God was but a speculative 
being. His existence could not be proven nor disproven. 
Thus, it was questionable whether man was created in His 
image or part of a divine plan. Although science replaced 
God, it could not account for everything. Polanyi has said 
that Mwe know more than we can tell."1 To the existential­
ist, caught in this uncertainty, there was no underlying 
structure to our world, no rationality where past flowed in­
to present. There was only now, a structureless time in 
which men may engage in the process of examining their exis­
tence. Life has no beginning, middle, end. It is not com­
posed of climaxes. It is instead a series of events, 
combinations of various random circumstances which constitute 
the day to day minutes of existence. Movement for the exis­
tentialist is not toward a goal nor toward an abstract idea, 
T̂he Tacit Dimension (New Yorki Doubleday & Co., 1966), 
p. 4. 
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but within the time and space of now. 
The existentialist makes life present by flattening out 
space and time. Max Weber, a cubist artist, challenges the 
existing three-dimensional world view by reducing space to 
a flat picture plane. His "Composition With Three Figures" 
consists of a flat space interrupted by a series of geomet­
rical planes, each plane's surface displaying a complete 
range of color from light to dark. The result is that light 
does not come from the atmosphere surrounding the figures 
but is itself a means of defining depth in each surface. 
Depth or space is not attributed to the figure but is part 
of the picture surface. The feeling is that the canvas it­
self has more reality than the real world. Its flat surface 
carries an energy and life that are present, that must be 
dealt with by the individual who recognizes this flatness. 
The playwright Harold Pinter achieves this effect of 
here and now presentness by disrupting time in a way that 
demands interpretation. In his play The Dumb Waiter,1 two 
men are constantly interrupted by madness. An eighty-seven-
year-old man is run over by a truck. A dumb waiter keeps 
opening and closing. There seems to be no meaning within 
the acts themselves. Why should a man be run over? Why 
should a dumb waiter appear unsummoned? Since the acts in 
themselves lack meaning, it is up to the characters in the 
lln The Birthday Party and Other Plays (Londoni Methu-
en, i960). 
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play to give them meaning. Gus opens the dumb waiter and 
puts in a bottle of milk. He gives the dumb waiter a func­
tion. The feeling is that the space of the audience's 
lives are equally absurd and disordered. The only way to 
make sense out of those spaces and times is to take the 
events into our own lives and give them a meaning. We 
therefore must deal with them, not by seeking cause and ef­
fect, but by subjectively inserting a meaning upon them, by 
integrating them into our own individual lives. 
What this existential subjectivity meant for education 
was that there was no absolute truth, no one image of man to 
rely upon. Truth was contextual. We build up a history of 
images, each image modifying and multiplying the possibili­
ties of our lives. Consider the image of love. If love is 
never present in our lives, we have no way of thinking about 
love and therefore of extending it to others. That which 
is never present cannot be remembered. Similarly, that 
which is once present cannot be forgotten. We live in a 
mechanical world and this mechanical world colors our think­
ing. Disco music is a result of this mechanical intrusion. 
It is a dance of electronically assisted abandon. Its 
pleasure depends upon the mechanical reproduction of sounds, 
flashing lights, and the physical sensation of repeated vi­
brations. The problem is not that disco music surrounds our 
lives. The problem is the extent that mechanical thinking 
has invaded our own thinking. The fear is that we may all 
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be characters in someone else's play who, having played our 
lines so often, have begun to believe those are our lines. 
To the existentialist, therefore, there are only acts 
of examination and commitment* Each person, immersed in 
his time and his space, must live his own story. Identity 
is sought in the subjective. One does not look upon him­
self as a spectator, consider all the possible choices, and 
then decide. Instead, he works out his choices in the 
everyday encounters of his life. Why and how are more im­
portant questions than what. To explain something is more 
important than measuring it. The search for truth is always 
in relation to the context of that truth—historically, 
socially, personally. Knowing, therefore, is continually 
building up perspectives, examining the world that flows 
around us, and evaluating that world in terms of the indi­
vidual life. 
The existential point of view is based upon two beliefs 
i 
about the human being. One belief is that he is an imagina­
tive, valuing being who brings unity to the random combina­
tions of phenomena around him through his subjective 
interpretation of those phenomena. The second is that the 
interpretations are never done in isolation but within the 
context of an absurd and disorderly world that demands a day 
by day, minute by minute choosing between tensions. 
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These two beliefs are given voice in the writings of 
S/rfren Kierkegaard and Fyodor Dostoevsky. 
Kierkegaardi 
The Integrity and Authenticity of the Individual 
As primarily a religious thinker, Kierkegaard felt com­
pelled to free God from reason. He felt that reason was a 
human criterion and that it made God in man's own image. 
It set God up as an absolute being, the source of all things, 
and also a form that existed out there, as a rational possi­
bility, available to the individual only through the sacra­
ments and formalism of the Church. Kierkegaard protested 
that this reasonable God was not God at all. God was a per­
sonal experience and "couldn't be understood purely under 
the aspects of eternity"1 and possibility. Christianity 
was something that concerned the individual alone and reli­
gious faith was a personal leap into the unknown. On the 
way to freeing God from reason, Kierkegaard also freed man 
to be an existent being, a choosing, experiencing person 
who comprehended truth with something other than logic and 
reason. 
Freeing the individual to exist began with Hegel. It 
was Hegel who asked the one question that hadn't yet been 
asked in philosophy. If I personally die, does life have 
meaning? According to Hegel's predecessors, the Idealists, 
3-Barrett, Irrational Man, p. 160. 
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life always has meaning. It goes on with or without us. 
There is a history of things and this history persists with 
or without the individual. In such a scheme, death is an 
unknown. We simply pass on to a hoped-for eternity and 
therefore spend our lives here on earth in anticipation of 
this unknown future. Hegel argued, however, that death was 
something* It was a fact, a finite ending, and it was 
therefore imperative that living be something! that we live 
in the present and that we give life meaning. Hegel's 
proof was that nothing is there if you are not there to per­
ceive it. You may tell me Shakespeare existed as an histor­
ical fact but Shakespeare did not exist until I discovered 
him in the thirteenth year of my life. The world does not 
exist without each individual man's perception of it, and 
with each individual's death, these perceptions are termina­
ted. Therefore, the death of the individual had to be con­
sidered important. Furthermore, an individual's living was 
what gave meaning to life. Because of Hegel, philosophy 
had an ethical question. Previously, nobility, serfdom, 
good, and bad were attributed to classes of people. With 
Hegel, the responsibility for living a good life was given 
to the individual living that life. 
Having freed the individual to exist, Hegel attempted 
to define that individual. To him, man was a part of a sys­
tem of thought objectified. Lying behind our existence is 
a rationality, ordering, plan. Everything is derived from 
this reason. "What is rational is what is real, what is 
real is what is rational."1- Man therefore is a reasonable 
being. He experiences the world through his reason. All 
knowledge cones from these experiences. None of it is in­
born. Man is real only because he can reason his existence. 
Therefore, what is real is only what can be reasoned.' 
Kierkegaard couldn't accept this interpretation of the 
individual. For him, if man were a reasonable being alone, 
then he was objectified. He was but a concept, someone who 
acts this way and that way. In contrast, Kierkegaard felt 
that we exist first and then we reason. We are a particu­
lar individual living in a particular setting, participating 
in all that flows around us. Thus, thinking about living 
is different from living. We don't stand back and see it. 
We are subjectively emerged in it. We exist first. We are 
existential. 
Kierkegaard thus asks, what does it mean to be an 
authentic Christian? What does it mean to the individual 
to be a Christian in a subjective sense? How do we act if 
we take God into our day-by-day encounters rather than 
leaving Him out there, an all seeing Being who has nothing 
to do with our life except in the future and on Sundays? 
His answer was that the self initiates choice. To be 
llbid., pp. 159-161. 
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existent means we enter into a religious mode of being. We 
become one with Christ and assume responsibility for that 
oneness. We choose to be responsible to ourselves and that 
means being ethical in our dealings with others. It is in 
this moment-to-moment choosing that we become a single indi­
vidual. We are subjective beings who exist inwardly and 
then go out to define ourselves in relation to the world. 
Kierkegaard believed that consciousness, recognition 
of self, and continually choosing in terms of that self, was 
the core of being human. This belief has many implications 
for education. If being conscious is what we are about, 
then learning begins when the learner is conscious of him­
self as a choosing individual, not as a member of a group 
or a social organization. Therefore, truth isn't something 
we take in, but something that we go forth to produce. 
Truth is arriving at the center of one's being, engaging in 
finding one's life. Such truth does not belong to the in­
tellect alone. It belongs to the subjective imagination 
which flows through all our existence. To be conscious is 
to engage in paradoxes, to make choices that cannot be re­
solved, only held in place by the imagination* We must lose 
ourselves to find ourselves. We must give up the finite 
(divest ourselves of our own particular interests) in order 
to get it back. Curriculum, therefore, should use the indi­
vidual and his experiences as its foundation. Furthermore, 
teaching and learning experiences should be structured in 
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terms of making ethical and moral choices. In this sense, 
true justice transcends self interest because it takes into 
account that we do not exist alone. 
Dostoevskyi 
Freedom in the Knowledge of Good and Evil 
Kierkegaard had given me a story, a path whose dimen­
sions were yet to be determined* He had made his choice to 
be a Christian both alone and in dread. By relating himself 
to God in both isolation and freedom, he affirmed the integ­
rity and authenticity of the individual. Yet, the question 
remained, in what context was the individual to choose? 
What made man, singular, in relation to God also man, plu­
ral, in relation to mankind? Although Kierkegaard had 
alluded to this, it was not yet clear. From Dostoevsky 
came the reply, freedom is in the knowledge of good and 
evil. Man is a collective being whose ignorance as well as 
charity touches others. 
Dostoevsky, like Kierkegaard, was concerned with the 
individual living in a time of social disorder and reli­
gious uncertainty. An important idea emerging in nineteenths 
century Russia was rationalism. Rationalism held that man, 
behaving according to rational scientific principles, would 
create a Utopian society. Man's rational and productive 
ordering of nature would result in progress for all. Per­
haps the individual would be lost, as ordering required 
adherence to certain rules, but community would be gained. 
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This period of rationalism, however, failed to take into 
account an important idea, that man himself might not prefer 
to be rational. He might prefer disorder if it meant he 
had freedom. He might prefer to suffer if it meant he was 
the determiner of that suffering* If man were primarily a 
creature of will and spirit, then rationalism, which sub­
jected that will, was therefore inhumane. 
In Notes From the Underground,1 Dostoevsky traces the 
exclusively rational view of man to its ultimate end. Notes 
Prom the Underground concerns an intelligent man who has 
become separated and lonely, rejected by the world, and sub­
servient to its rational ordering. After forty years of 
living underground, he attempts to explain the reason for 
that separation and loneliness. Through a series of dia­
logues with himself, his confession reveals a man torn 
between his intuition, wishing to act upon the world, and 
his reason, which makes that action impossible. 
According to the underground man, science and reason 
have been proclaimed as the indisputable laws whereby all 
men operate. To be reasonable means we will always act in 
our own best interests. If this is true, then why does man 
choose what is not in his best interest? Why does man, be­
cause he must build a road toward a goal, engage in build­
ing it away from it? The underground man concludes that 
N̂otes From the Underground and The Grand Inquisitor, 
trans. Ralph E. Matlaw (New Yorki E.P. Dutton, I960). 
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man is essentially a creative being who has a need to be 
conscious, even if that consciousness is not in his best 
interests. He has to play life as if it were a chess game, 
not a set pattern. He has to know there is a possibility 
that he might be able to beat himself. Therefore, reason 
alone cannot account for man because it leaves out indepen­
dent choice* 
Because the underground man is primarily rational, he 
is confused by the irrationality to which he has traced 
reason. He therefore turns into himself, more and more 
living his life in day dreams until, when day dreams are no 
longer enough, he retreats into a hyperconsciousness of 
pain. He inflicts his own pain, just for the sake of know­
ing that he is still alive, until that pain becomes a kind 
of hedonistic pleasure. In time, the joy from pain also 
goes away and he is left with nothing but inertia. 
This idea of rationality taken to its extreme is exem­
plified in two stories the underground man tells. One con­
cerns an officer who is fighting with another in a tavern. 
The underground man, desperate for companionship, contact 
with people, goes into the tavsrn, hoping to pick a fight* 
Instead, he is completely ignored by the officer. This ex­
perience is humiliating and yet, in the humiliation, the 
underground man sees some sort of recognition* He reads 
contempt as human contact. 
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The second story concerns Liza, a prostitute whom he 
meets. Liza represents a person he can finally dominate. 
He begins to play with her feelings, to see how far he can 
carry the domination. Gradually, Liza responds to him and 
offers him her love as a human being. This devastates the 
underground man. He cannot accept love because, reasonably, 
the one who gives love is in the dominant position. He 
therefore turns maliciously on her, extending her money, 
relegating her once again to the role of prostitute. 
In both of these encounters with other people, the 
underground man is so concerned with manipulating others, 
with setting up perfect relationships, that he ends up 
manipulating himself. He "rejects human society . . . and 
asserts himself by acting against his best interests, mere­
ly to assert his individuality. 
Notes From the Underground concludes with the picture 
of a bent, distorted figure. His cries have been unheard 
and unanswered and his logic and reason have proven inade­
quate. Just as the underground man lacked the vision of 
what to change to, he lacked the stamina to continue seeking 
that change. As he says, how do you dispute 2 & 2 • 4? How 
long do you hit your head against a brick wall when you 
don't even know who causes this nor what it would be like 
to have a different existence? The underground man, 
llbid., p. xx. 
precisely because of his reasonf has been unable to act. 
Because of his rationality, he is compelled to trace causes, 
to think, to deduce logically until logic itself disappears 
and he is left with only the anesthesia of excess and 
finally inertia. 
The tragedy of the underground man is the tragedy of 
modern man. We must live in reality because we exist, 
after all, in social situations. At the same time it is 
through conflict with that reality, questioning, doubting, 
holding it up for reflection, that the individual conscious­
ness develops. The underground man is unable to hold on to 
either social or individual consciousness. Because he can't 
find a reason for this madness he lives in, he retreats 
more and more into himself. He is Samuel Beckett's charac­
ters in Waiting for Godot.1 There is no God, no under­
lying meaning, no end. There is only the task of occupying 
oneself while waiting. The burdens the underground man has 
to carry are so many and the facilities he has to alleviate 
those burdens are so few that ultimately his spirit spends 
itself out. 
In Notes From the Underground, Dostoevsky offers no 
solutions, only overwhelming despair. Rather than affirm­
ing the perfectibility of the individual and therefore con­
cern for all of humanity by a mystical leap of faith, 
•̂London* Paber and Faber, Ltd., 1956. 
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Dostoevsky contends that there are no answers. Man, because 
of his humanness, can never discover the absolute* He can 
never have a sudden revelation which will have more than a 
transitory effect. He can only, day by day, constantly re­
affirm himself. He must constantly choose between tensions* 
He is both good and evil, reason and feeling, and these two 
forces are always in tension. There can never be harmony 
on the earth, only a balance of disharmony. Like the art of 
Georgia O'Keefe, where sky is flung up into space and the 
earth catches it and holds it in place with a diagonal, so 
our lives consist of everyday encounters in which we reach 
out and explore, open ourselves to questioning, to being 
askew, and then reel that line in for counterbalance.. As 
it has been said, we are condemned to meaning, to con­
stantly choosing. We reach upward to touch sky and hold it 
in place with the horizon of our living. 
Holding the diagonal in place is what we are about in 
choosing. It is what the underground man is unable to do. 
Yet, out of that very despair of the underground man's 
story comes hope in the story of the Grand Inquisitor. 
In Dostoevsky's The Grand Inquisitor, the Grand Inqui­
sitor of the Spanish Inquisition takes as his prisoner 
Christ who, once again, is asked to explain his meaning. 
He is asked to answer the paradox that man, created to be a 
free being, can find in that freedom only unending suffer­
ing, struggling, choosing. Where is the justice, where is 
the significance, asks the Inquisitor, of a life, lived in 
misery here on earth, and that life being but a mere prepa­
ration for a life lived in the hereafter? The questions 
asked by the Inquisitor are the questions that all men capa­
ble of thought and aware of their condition have asked 
through time. This is the Christian dilemma. It is not 
that we don't know who Christ is. We accept him. At the 
same time, we also doubt whether we any longer believe in 
Him. Christ's defense is the defense it was once long ago, 
the defense of silence. Christ responds in the end to the 
Grand Inquisitor with a kiss on the lips, and the Grand 
Inquisitor, while warmed in his heart, adheres to his idea. 
The Grand Inquisitor is a return to a primitive tradi­
tion. The tradition is one of Christ fighting the Devil, 
with the Devil incarnate in the form of the Grand Inquisi­
tor. God and the devil are symbols for life-affirming and 
life-denying forces.1 The soliloquy of the Grand Inquisi­
tor occurs at the time of the Spanish Inquisition. It is 
preceded by tales of suffering and is filled with despair 
at the condition of one's fellow man. It is the story of a 
conflict between a Christ who has apparently created a 
world founded in suffering and agony and the Grand Inquisi­
tor, head of the Roman Catholic Church, who, concerned for 
M̂alcolm V. Jones, Dostoyevskyi The Novel of Discord 
(New York* Harper & Row Publishers, Barnes & Noble Import 
Division, 1976), p. 175. 
^3 
this suffering, has counterattacked by defining an authori­
ty (the Church) that will be the standard for men to live 
by. The Grand Inquisitor maintains that because Christ 
erred, he, the Church, will give man what Christ promised 
all along. The Grand Inquisitor will give man happiness and 
security in exchange for man's allegiance and, therefore, 
freedom. He, the Grand Inquisitor, will comfort man with 
the authority and mystery of the Church. He will take the 
suffering that Christ requires upon himself. 
The Grand Inquisitor is thus the antithesis of Christ. 
He is the totalitarian master of men who gives them bread 
and relieves them from the anguish of being themselves. To 
him, men are sheep who need to be relieved of the agony of 
selfhood. To be a Christian is a burden, a series of con­
stant reaffirmations. Christ demands perfect freedom and 
autonomy of men. To the Grand Inquisitor, this demand is 
incompatible with man's nature. Man doesn't have the 
strength to be free. Thus, the Grand Inquisitor relieves 
man of that burden but, at the same time, leaves him the 
peace of believing he is a Christian.1 
However, in promising man everything, the Grand Inqui­
sitor takes away the one thing that makes man mant the 
never-ending, exhausting freedom to choose from the moral 
basis of his' own consciousness. Morality, not based on 
-̂Barrett, Irrational Man, pp. m-175. 
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one's free choice, is not morality. The Grand Inquisitor's 
motivations are in the purest humanistic form. His solu­
tion, however, is a prophecy of totalitarianism* In his 
scheme of things, the authority of the individual is sub­
jected to an outside authority. 
The form of the Grand Inquisitor's discourse is the 
same form taken long ago when Christ was tempted by Satan. 
The three temptations are really a questioning of the three 
human limitations Christ has placed on mankind! the desire 
for food, miracle, and authority. These three desires are 
the universal problems of free will, unquestioning faith, 
and a craving for a universal order. In the first tempta­
tion, Christ can choose for man bread, wealth, food enough 
for all—a true social justice, or he can choose for him 
free will. Both are not possible. If man has free will, 
then he is free to choose what is not good, what takes from 
others. Christ, however, is not concerned with man's physi­
cal emotions, but with his moral ones. He chooses to give 
men free will rather than the security of bread. He wishes 
men to choose Him and His pathway voluntarily, not because 
He provides for their physical needs. 
In the second temptation, Christ can prove himself the 
Son of God through miracles and thus be an object for wor­
ship. Christ, instead, lets man choose for himself on 
faith alone. He refuses to be the authority, proven by 
miracles. Man alone, through his agony, through his 
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conflict and search, must be the ultimate authority. There 
is no one miraculous way to divinity. 
In the third temptation, Christ refuses to establish a 
kingdom of the world. He prefers centuries of confusion to 
a society that is defined. Universal happiness cannot be 
guaranteed. There can only be each man seeking to bring 
happiness to other men. 
It is in the three temptations that lie man's opportu­
nities to be human. They make him responsible for himself* 
It is, therefore, in assuming responsibility that man takes 
the first step toward believing there is a higher Being and 
becoming one with that Being. 
The story ends with no solution, only a kiss. Truth 
exists by its own virtue. It is in this reply with no solu­
tion, this contest with no winner, this paradox that Christ 
has given us a goal, yet made us human so that we could not 
obtain that goal, that the answer is found. Life exists to 
be a paradox. Existing does not mean finding a pathway to 
good or evil, a road to right or wrong. It means responding 
to questions, confronting doubts, and taking temporary 
stands. Prom our doubts, from our conflicts, from our 
struggles, comes a life that is lived, not merely one that 
exists. Because we have been given the freedom to choose, 
it is in the process of our choosing that we become both 
human and divine. Man, because he chooses in the full 
knowledge of good and evil, chooses to exercise his 
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humanness. Justice is contingent upon each man's choice. 
To come from Notes From the Underground to The Grand 
Inquisitor is to go from darkness to light. It is to recog­
nize that man is at once overwhelmed and at the same time 
carries within him the seeds for being and responsibility. 
It is to this dual nature of man that education must speak. 
It must give children a place in which to articulate their 
despair lest they, like the underground man, speak only to 
themselves. It must also recognize that there is no abso­
lute truth because there is no absolute criterion for deter­
mining that. Just as these two stories are myths, so too 
are the narratives of our lives. The narratives are tempo­
rary explanations whose finality we can never know. We can 
only choose in the knowledge of good and evil, in the eter­
nal tension between the two. 
While Kierkegaard had revealed to me a love of One, 
Dostoevsky had moved from the love of One to a love of all 
individuals. "To transform the world, create it afresh, 
men must turn into another path ... a brother to every 
one."l Yet, somehow stories never end. "Way leads on to 
way,"̂  as Robert Frost has told us. A phrase here, a word 
there, attaches itself and demands to be explored, until the 
F̂yodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. 
Constance Garnett (New York! Modern Library, 1929), p. 375. 
2Poetry of Robert Frost, line 14, p. 105* 
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story evolves, expanded and enhanced. It was two words 
spoken by Martin Buber that gave my story that expansion. 
These words were I-Thou, a meeting place where unselfish 
interestedness was possible, where man as collective being 
might acknowledge his frailties as well as his responsibili­
ties. 
Buberi 
Mutually Confirming Each Other's Being 
Martin Buber believed our whole quest in life was to 
find each other, to get out of being trapped in ourselves. 
The self, the individual comes into the world immersed in a 
relation, part of a species. It is his task in life to 
find and redefine himself. For Buber, this redefinition 
was done in terms of community. Because what we each see 
and choose in life is important, then each of our percep­
tions is equally important. Reality is therefore not an 
absolute truth, but a process of comparing individual 
truths, a living in ethical relation. 
According to Buber, man becomes aware of self because 
he has the ability to reason. Unlike the animals who are 
incorporated into the environment, he recognizes that he is 
different from others. This differentness means we are 
singular, alone. Thus, we attempt to gain control over our 
environment by giving it a name. We catalogue and describe 
it. We set things up to be subject and object, I-It. We 
abstract the world and distance ourselves from it. 
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Ultimately, we become so tied up in I-It that we treat our­
selves as objects. We believe we operate according to cer­
tain irrefutable laws and consciousness is merely an 
illusion produced by our feelings.* 
I-It relationships are necessary if we are to learn to 
live in our world so that it enhances us. But I-It cannot 
alleviate our loneliness nor give us a vision of what it 
means to be human. To be human is to enter into relation 
with others. It is they who keep us from being lonely and 
terrified, who give us comfort in that they reflect our 
very same loneliness. It is they who give us the model for 
being human because we see ourselves reflected in them. 
Seeing them, we see who we are. 
To enter into relationship with others is to enter into 
I-Thou. In I-Thou we recognize that part of us exists in 
the other and that we share this thing called humanness. 
We therefore acknowledge and affirm the other being. We see 
the other for all he can be as a human being. We free him 
from any qualities of good and evil and we share a reality* 
This sharing is made possible because we raise each other's 
presence. We respond with our whole being and confront the 
other in our completeness. We do not think about our being 
in relation to their being, but we open our whole selves to 
be affected. Because we go to the other in trust, anger, 
Ĥill, Education and the Endangered Individual, p. 191. 
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love, confusion and fear, that other responds to us, and 
his presence is reflected back on us. 
This meeting place between I-Thou is built upon faith 
and trust. We can never really know the other, but we have 
faith that in our meeting we will know him. We therefore 
enter into it in trust. We completely open up our being 
toward another by responding wholly, with body and soul. 
Faith becomes the context in which we judge knowledge. 
Through this relation, God becomes present to us. He 
is not someone, who exists out there or deals with us as a 
group. He is an individual, made present in each individual. 
Thus, God is present in the ©reryday and the everyday is made 
hallowed. To engage in I-Thou is to find the eternal Thou 
that exists in all of us. This is the ultimate spiritual­
ity. 
Martin Buber, while proclaiming that our whole quest 
in life is to find each other, to enter into relationship, 
offers us very little instruction on how to get into these 
relationships. I-Thou encounters are mystic, aesthetic, 
spiritual. They are unpredictable and discontinuous. In 
fact, the more one thinks about I-Thou relationships, the 
more difficult and far-removed and impossible they seem. 
How can one enter into I-Thou when relationships are pre­
determined by the situation itself? We come into a class 
as teachers and our role may have more potency than our 
being human. Certain images and certain reactions are 
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already set up. Furthermore, what does knowledge of objects 
and environments (what we seem to be teaching in school) 
have to do with having collective experiences? Does the 
cognitive enrich the affective? Buber offers no answers, 
but offers us a way of entering into relationships through 
the process called dialogue. 
Buber is an existentialist* How one knows means what 
one wants to know. We are the sum total of our choices. 
Spiritual matters must be pursued through the spirit, 
through opening up the whole being to choosing. Buber is 
also an idealist. Our experiences, the past as well as 
present day encounters, make us. Therefore, if we are to 
open up the spirit to choosing, we must give it an environ­
ment that supports that choosing. It is through dialogue 
that we do so. 
To engage in dialogue means that we 6ee each other as 
possible truth bearers, not just objects wearing human 
masks. It means we are willing to put aside our defenses 
of self-justification, we are willing to block out the 
images we expect to receive, and we open our minds to new 
colors, new possibilities, new images. It means we are 
willing to respond critically, with honesty and trust. 
Speech goes forth and is reconstructed with each going forth 
so that it feeds back, both to speaker and listener, holding 
up for examination new insights that are to be tested, tried 
on for size, and then sent forth again. 
51 
Dialogue is the common medium through which we collec­
tively explore the world we have seen and are seeing. It is 
how we educate ourselves to our fullest capacity. 
Martin Buber has been called "a lyricist of existence."! 
Because man's existence is tied up with community, the lyric 
finds its story line in moral education. Every act in 
which we human beings engage, because it involves the right 
and welfare of others, has the potential for being a moral 
act. By our every mood, word, and gesture, we perpetuate 
our own belief system, whether we are aware of it or not. 
That belief system is manifest in the questions we pose, the 
decisions we make, the behaviors we display. Since it is 
inevitably a part of our lives, the question is, how do we 
bring those beliefs into view? How do we examine them, the 
values we live by and the reasons inherent in them, with a 
view towards either affirming them or seeing if there isn't 
a better belief system? For Martin Buber, the answer was 
by engaging in I-Thou relationships, allowing each person to 
act alone in reference to his own life situation, and at the 
same time, demanding that each person stand responsible for 
that life situation. Moral education is neither a program 
of instruction nor a ready-made value system. Moral educa­
tion is opening "the way to the confrontations which will 
require /the individual to make choices ... In his 
iBarrett, Irrational Man, p. 236. 
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freedom then he will shape a conscience for himselfi he 
will construct a morality."1 Opening the way to confronta­
tions begins with dialogue. 
Martin Buber, like Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, traces 
man's loss of spirit to the accumulation of scientific 
knowledge and social control. Man, no longer having direct 
relations with other men, is bound to them only through 
physical proximity. He is placed in groups for the purposes 
of productivity and control. Buber felt the way to bring 
spirit and relationship back into man's life was to make 
the everyday hallowed. Unlike Kierkegaard who said the 
religious state was beyond the ethical, Buber says they are 
the same. Morality is a sense of responsibility toward the 
eternal Thou in another. Relation to God is in relation to 
man. 
A classroom is a collection of human beings, future 
adults who have come together in this place called school 
to try out new roles, to seek new interpretations for their 
lives. Each brings his own personal history and his own 
personal motivations that serve as the basis for his autho­
rity. Dialogue broadens and adds to that authority, by 
giving him more worlds and more values to choose from and 
by making him responsible for those choices he does make. 
Dialogue, in that it recognizes that all our lives working 
Ĝreene, Existential Encounters, p. I65. 
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together have significance, gives validity to the indivi­
dual life. It allows these future adults to choose their 
own worlds, to build their own cultures. And, it allows 
for incompleteness. It recognizes that there is never only 
one answer to be learned as there is never only one person 
to be developed. There are only persons in the process of 
developing. 
The Story 
Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Buber have presented 
three definitive aspects of what it means to be human, 
each one an expansion of the other. Beginning with Kierke­
gaard's emphasis on the individual as a subjective being, 
-v 
the narrative continued with Dostoevsky*s belief that man 
must make his choices within the context of both good and 
evil, and culminated with a framework in which the indivi­
dual is moved to make ethical choices in Buber*s conception 
of dialogue. Each man, concerned with the quality of liv­
ing, spoke to an aesthetic model for education. 
The human being, as Kierkegaard pointed out, is an 
artist. He is a subjective, imaginative being who has a 
forward-propelling capacity to initiate, imagine, and cre­
ate. The significance of this subjective consciousness 
lies in the belief that without it there can be no inten-
tionality and therefore no thought. As Elizabeth Sewell 
has pointed out, thought is an activity which we initiate. 
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It is an intellectual tool which is an extension of our­
selves, just as a violin is an extension of a violinist. 
It is integral to human activity, provided that the human 
individual initiates this activity.1 Without the subjective 
individual choosing, there is no thought and therefore no 
learning. 
The problem in schools is that we let the subjective 
individual choose, but only in certain circumstances. We 
recognize the child is an artist but we relegate the imagi­
nation to the arts. We tuck them off in a corner and sepa­
rate them out. In this way, we are able to empty the cogni­
tive domain of all feeling. We set up an either/or 
dichotomy and this distortion leads us to believe thinking 
is synonymous with analyzing and concluding. Furthermore, 
when we insert this analysis and logic on curriculum, what 
we get are completed stories whose order is linear. Mathe­
matics has a beginning, middle, end. It is completed and 
we grasp it, not conceptually, but in a one, two, three 
order. When we so package the disciplines, we have left 
the student nothing to imagine, no spaces to look between. 
We draw his attention to figure and he is unable to see 
ground. We have presented curriculum as finality rather 
than metaphor, a possibility for exploration, and we have 
reduced his conscious life to social categories and 
Êlizabeth Sewell, The Human Metaphor (Notre Dame, Indi-
anai University of Notre Dame Press, 1964), pp. 28-29. 
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behavioral examples. 
If awakening the imagination is what we are about, 
supporting individual dreamwork, then somehow this human 
spirit must be awakened in choosing. He must be made aware, 
as Dostoevsky pointed out, of the diagonal in which he 
lives. That we live in a world of both good and evil, that 
man has the capacity to be rational as well as irrational, 
those are the dialectics, not from which he must choose, 
but with which he must learn to live. Choosing is holding 
the diagonals in place. 
To awaken the human spirit is to force one to look into 
the nooks and crannies, to think in a new mode. So much of 
life which surrounds us is merely taken for granted. As 
Robert Ornstsin has pointed out, we simply ignore constan­
cies. We take in information through the senses and then 
compare that information according to memory and expecta­
tions. Because we are bombarded by so many senses each 
moment, the sensory systems serve for data reduction. They 
ignore what is constant because they already know how to 
deal with that. They let in, therefore, what is jarring.1 
We drive a car without being aware we have driven the car. 
We may attend school for twelve years without ever being 
aware we were there. 
One way to open up this sensitivity, to free the subject 
iThe Psychology of Consciousness (San Francisco, Cali­
forniaiW.H. Freeman & Co., 1972), pp. 18-2?. 
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from the ennui that surrounds him, is through encounters 
with aesthetic objects, which each discipline has the poten­
tial to be. Aesthetic objects are jarring. They displace 
us from the everyday by giving us a counter-consciousness 
off which to reflect our own beliefs and values. Emily 
Dickinson has written that "The mountains grow unnoticed, / 
Their purple figures rise / Without attempt, exhaustion, / 
Assistance or applause."1 It is startling, this view of a 
mountain. That it can change, grow through the seasons 
simply because that is its nature, is far different from 
the landmark called Pilot Mountain that is the halfway 
point on my journey to the Parkway. The aesthetic object, 
Emily's poem, gives me pause to think and I move back and 
forth between object and self, comparing perspectives, con­
tinually breaking and reuniting with the mountain, seeing 
my familiar world from a different perspective. 
Dialectics then are the materials which force us to 
examine our lives and, at the same time, they are what com­
pose that life. Man as a subjective being who intends to 
create his world does so through logic and intuition. As 
Polanyi, in speaking of the mathematician, has pointed out, 
"he works his way through a discovery by shifting his con­
fidence from intuition to computation and back again from 
l"The Mountains Grow Unnoticed," in The Complete Poems 
of Emily Dickinson, ed. Thomas H. Johnson (Boston* Little 
Brown and company, i960), lines 1-4, p. 371. 
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computation to intuition, while never releasing his hold on 
either of the two.M̂  He constructs the figure as well as 
contemplates the self-activity within the figure. To cre­
ate requires analysis as well as synthesis, creation as 
well as critical evaluation. 
Dostoevsky offers no solutions as to how we hold the 
diagonal in place. He asks only that we enter into its 
ambiguity and choose for ourselves. He does not explain) 
he imagines, and in that imagination, he demands our imagi­
nation, our consciousness. As Elizabeth Sewell has said, 
"Art offers the ordinary human being shape after shape of 
myth, with this pattern of suffering-which-is-effort . . . 
with which to identify our own pattern of life, for growth 
and understanding."2 
Knowing then that man has the capacity to do good as 
well as evil, then choices must be made in terms of their 
humanness, their ethical and moral dimensions. Martin 
Buber's call for dialogue, in which the resultant knowledge 
isn't about objects or about self, but about self in rela­
tion to objects and the people who have made those objects, 
is such a moral dimension. It is through dialogue that we 
are enabled to enter into aesthetic encounters. Through 
dialogue we are asking for illumination from each other, 
Q̂uoted in Sewell, The Human Metaphor, p. 111. 
2Ibid., p. 152. 
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that they serve as our resources. Through the encounter we 
are moved out of our lived situation and made one with 
other's lived situations. The result is that our choices 
are no longer in our name alone hut in the name of us all. 
Through dialogue, morality becomes cumulative choice, a con­
tinual meeting of I-Thou. 
An aesthetic model for education therefore means we 
conceive of students as artists and we present curriculum as 
aesthetic objects. We give students an opportunity to cre­
ate their own metaphors by jarring them from what is known 
and by affirming their integrity, their right to interpret 
and imagine, to clarify and criticize. Furthermore, we give 
them a structure in which to create by relating knowledge 
to living dealings between men. As such, a model fulfills 
what it means to be human in the Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, 
Buber sense. 
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CHAPTER III 
EPILOGUE 
Sffren Kierkegaard, Pyodor Dostoevsky, Martin Buber no 
longer choose me, for I am they and they are me. The end, 
however, is not yet come if these words and the words of 
others like them are to be translated into educational 
thought, and if we are to live together in the meeting place 
between I and Thou. So be it. Circles within circles, 
stories without end. It is in the telling that the story is 
told. 
PART II 
THE STORIES 
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CHAPTER IV 
AESTHETICSi MOVING INTO THE PRESENT 
To acknowledge the human being as both mind and spirit 
is to recognize that it is the individual who gives meaning 
and continuity to the experiences of his life. Therefore, 
examining knowledge and learning must be done within the 
context of those individual lives. One way to do this is to 
focus on the systems we've erected, the containers of knowl­
edge, as if they were metaphor, as if they might tell us 
who we are. Because the nature of the metaphor is to iden­
tify not only the world, but ourselves in relation to that 
world, the metaphor may tell us both how man has named the 
world and how he has named himself. Looking at knowledge 
as metaphor is perceiving patterns, overall textures that 
run through all our systems of knowledge. It is also relat­
ing to those patterns figuratively, acknowledging that it 
is "the individual human personality /who? must tie all the 
loose ends together into an organic whole."*-
Ŵerner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy (New Yorki 
Harper & Rowi Harper Torchbooks, 1962;, p. 210. 
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CHAPTER V 
KNOWLEDGE AS METAPHOR 
Containers 
the Cambridge ladies who live in furnished souls 
are unbeautiful and have comfortable minds 
(also, with the church's protestant blessings 
daughter, unscented shapeless spirited) 
they believe in Christ and Longfellow, both dead, 
are invariably interested in so many things— 
at the present writing one still finds 
delighted fingers knitting for the is it Poles? 
perhaps. While permanent faces coyly bandy 
scandal of Mrs. N and Professor D 
...the Cambridge ladies do not care, above 
Cambridge if sometimes in its box of 
sky lavender and cornerless, the 
moon rattles like a fragment of angry candy 
ee cummings, "The Cambridge Ladies"* 
A rope on the sand in front of the Royal Hawaiian Hotel 
separates the guest bathing area from the non-guest bathing 
area. The sand on one side of the rope is no different 
from the sand on the other side of the rope, nor does the 
sun shine at a different angle on one side than on the 
other. The purpose of the rope is to act as a gathering 
together place, to separate who one is from who one isn't. 
Because it separates inner space from outer space, it be­
comes an enclosure, a holding place for possessions. 
As an enclosure frames certain possessions, so too do 
3-Poemsi 1923-19(New Yorki Harcourt, Brace & World, 
195*0» lines 1-14, p. 58. 
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we frame the content of our lives. We build a scaffolding 
around our existence and frame it with a definite set of 
values, fixed in terms of outlooks and constant in the 
parameters under which limited change may occur. Like 
picking shells at the beach, we pluck from the flow beliefs 
and values, rejecting some, tucking others away so that, at 
any moment, we have a specific outlook on the world. If we 
are speaking of ourselves as individuals, we call it our 
charisma. If we are speaking of a group, we call it our 
culture, and, if we are educators, we call it our institu­
tion of schooling. 
The purpose then of enclosures is to reveal to us who 
we are. They are our systems of knowledge, our mode of 
operation within the world. As such, they bring unity to 
the diversity of what we are and what we plan for our lives. 
They personify what we have found to be valuable and signi­
ficant in our culture. 
Traditionally, knowledge has been defined as many 
things* verifiable empirical data, the sum of information 
conserved by civilization, a catalogue of concepts that 
facilitate our social living. Each of these are possibili­
ties for what knowledge might be. Because we are Plato's 
man in the cave, we do not know what reality is. We see 
only enclosures of that reality, that is, what our senses 
allow us to see. Like gazing out the rear window while 
seated in a moving car, we are the fulcrum around which 
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thousands of sensations flow. Momentarily we are able 
to focus on a point, seize a sensation, and hold it still 
for examination. In an attempt to hold the sensation still, 
we give it a name. Naming makes it understandable. As 
Susanne Langer has pointed out, naming identifies the attri­
butes so that we not only understand the concept of the ob­
ject or experience, but also the part played by the object 
in the situation.1 This naming allows us to attain as well 
as organize information.2 We are thus able to transform 
experiences into concepts so that we can hold on to them.3 
The symbols allow us to think in terms of what might happen 
if. They allow us to think of things which aren't here.**' 
And, they allow us to think with them so that we don*t have 
to think about them.5 By naming the object, we have en­
closed it in a container. We have distanced it from our­
selves so that it is no longer frightening nor jumbled, but 
now usable. 
The rope at the Royal Hawaiian was originally intended 
to define the elite, the guests of the aristocratic hotel. 
Yet, by definition, there can be no elite group unless there 
is a non-elite group. They both exist by virtue of the 
other and, therefore, both are significant. 
P̂hilosophy in a New Key (Cambridge, Mass.t Harvard 
University Press, 1951)» P» 137. 
2Ibid., p. 26. 3lbid., p. 125. 
^Ibid., p. 30. 5lbid., p. 283. 
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Because enclosures are human products, constructs of 
the imagination, then multiple enclosures exist. We build 
onto what has gone before and at the same time make new dis­
coveries.1 As Michael Novak points out in The Experience 
of Nothingness.̂  we constantly invent ourselves to fit the 
situation. And, at the same time, we define ourselves by 
means of our projects. Naming is a geometrical process, 
not an arithmetical one. Rather than a one to one corres­
pondence, each naming involves multiple levels of meaning. 
This existence of multiple enclosures is a result of 
our perceptive abilities. Perceiving is not a matter of 
automatically recording senses, but it is a matter of indi­
vidually selecting what we allow in. Because we would be 
overwhelmed if we allowed everything in, we select what to 
see and then compare that information that we do see with 
our memory, our expectations, our consciousness.3 We choose 
not only what to look at but also how to look. As Michael 
Polanyi has indicated, there is a tacit component of knowl­
edge which supplements our focal awareness. We know a face 
by the features but we do not attend to those features. 
They are the tacit component that supplements our recognition 
ÂndrS Malraux, The Voices of Silence, trans. Stuart 
Gilbert (Garden City, New York* Doubleday & Company, 1953), 
p. 608. 
2New York» Harper & Row, 1970. 
Ôrnstein, Psychology of Consciousness, p. 18. 
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of the face.̂ - In this sense, we shape knowledge by the way 
we know it. In this internal/external dialogue, perception 
becomes a building up of wholes, and naming is the reflec­
tion of the experience, the insertion of order onto those 
reactions. 
Thus, while a reality may exist out there, our only 
way of talking about that reality is reflectively. The 
sense perceptions are filtered through the individual human 
and then given structure by means of language. Thus, what­
ever we name as reality is colored by all that we are as 
humans. It is in this sense that "natural science isn't a 
copy of material data. It is a construction or at way of 
thinking about that data. The only condition is that the 
logical consequences must be in accord with observable data."2 
Language, therefore naming, is not an abstract system 
independent of time, place, and speaker. Language is the 
means whereby we reperceive the nature of our experiences. 
It is an attempt to make those initial perceptions visible 
again and to give to them order. Through language we are 
able to reorganize, to give things a name, and also to 
communicate this naming to others. Language is our medium 
lMichael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
New York* Doubleday and Co., 1966;, pp. 4-5. 
2Heinrich Hertz, quoted in Ernst Cassirer, The Philos­
ophy of Symbolic Forms» vol. 3» The Phenomenology of 
Knowledge (New Haven. Conn.i Yale University Press, 1957), 
p. 20. 
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for both understanding and communication. Its power depends 
upon its ability to function in many different contexts. 
Its words, therefore, must be capable of dividing and sub­
dividing until they take on multiple meanings. Like the 
shell that adapts to its environment and, at the same time, 
stands firm in its construction, the language of understand­
ing and communication is language that stands firm in its 
meaning and, at the same time, conveys multiple meanings. 
Such a language is the language of metaphor, that ever-
evolving form caught in a moment's reflection, the image 
through which we interpret and live our lives. A metaphor 
is a visible symbol of the whole experience, the single 
grasping point that sums up its multiple meanings. Its 
function is to make concrete the human experience. Its com­
municative power depends upon the dialects—that it inform 
reason and intuition, that it be permanent and yet ever sub­
ject to change, that it react; against what has been said 
before and, at the same time, build upon what was said. 
In recalling the past, it enlightens the present and insures 
there will be a future. 
Cassirer explains this past, present, future continuum 
by saying that because we perceive a future, there is 
direction (multidirection) to the present. When emotions 
are given a name, language, man is abstracting some­
thing that is representative of the whole. He is compressing 
a total phenomenon into one of its factors so that the 
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essence isn't confined to a single moment but can be found 
again and again. By re-presenting thoughts and emotions, 
we are making them available to be remembered. The past 
enables us to conceive a future. Thus, because we can 
think of a future, we have direction in the present.1 
Thus, not only do multiple metaphors exist in a single 
life, and it is our task to identify those metaphors under 
which we live, but also each metaphor holds the possibility 
of shifting. The rope at the Royal Hawaiian no longer in­
cludes only the Binghams, the Kaisers, the old families of 
Hawaii. Belonging now is simply a matter of paying an ad­
mission price for a room. Similarly, the formal process of 
schooling, once thought of as a creative endeavor, is now 
thought of as an evolutionary one. As Gibson Winter has 
pointed out, we judge things in terms of growth and develop­
ment. Since the world is a machine whose laws can be de­
coded, human beings are rational individuals who can gain 
freedom through decoding those laws of nature. Education 
has therefore been converted into schooling. We separate 
kids from their home, we teach them skills and we replace 
personalization with authority, home bonding with cash re­
wards, and responsibility with disciplined socialization. 
Knowledge of nature therefore becomes a "source of power 
llbid., pp. m-115. 
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over the world rather than due to the moral order of the 
cosmos."* 
Enclosures do not suddenly shift from one shape to 
another. Most often the change is a matter of adjustment. 
New values are added on from time to time, but they do not 
replace the old values. Rather, they shove them over and 
exist side by side in an often uneasy peace, but a peace 
nevertheless. The old metaphors are not forgotten, simply 
displaced. 
At the Royal Hawaiian, those of the old families who 
still come to the hotel most often choose the sand area 
rather than the pool area. There is something about the un-
comfortableness of the sand that enhances one*s status 
whereas the nouveaux riches simply see the beach as an area 
for fun and frolic and do not have to suffer the indignities 
of sand in their hair and eyes to frolic. They therefore 
choose the pool area. The old money and the new money 
exist side by side but make their spaces different. 
So too does this occur in our educational systems. We 
separate those who believe the arts are a way of under­
standing and treating the world from those who believe that 
the sciences are a way. The drive to create more and more 
technology becomes separate from the drive to innovate. We 
1-Gibson Winter, "Community and Education", paper pre­
sented at Moral Values Conference, Quail*s Roost Center, 
Durham, North Carolina, Spring, 1980. 
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treat technology as if it were exacting and art as if it 
were speculative, missing the chance that they may enhance 
each other's being, that both art and science depend upon 
speculative leaps into the unknown and the rigorous verifi­
cation of those speculations. Werner Heisenberg, in speak­
ing of quantum mechanics, states that "physics is neither a 
mere description of experimental facts nor something deduci-
ble from such a description} instead . . • the physical 
scientist only arrives at his theory by speculative means."! 
Physics, one of the most exacting of our physical sciences, 
is dependent upon philosophy for its inception* Similarly, 
art, one of the most philosophical of our systems of thought, 
is dependent upon rigorous verification for its completion. 
As Susanne Langer states, "Art is the creation of forms sym­
bolic of human feeling."2 Because the forms are symbolic, 
their power depends upon control, patterning, sequencing, 
appropriateness. 
What happens in this uneasy peace of mixed metaphors 
existing side by side is that the enclosure ultimately se­
lects itself. . Enclosures are like buildings. When new 
ideas are admitted, they are simply added on like new wings, 
a Gothic structure here, a Renaissance revival there, so 
lphysics and Philosophy, p. 3. 
2"Art as Symbolic Expression! From Peeling and Form#" 
in Aesthetics, eds. George Dickie and Richard J. Sclafani 
(New Yorki St. Martin's Press, 1977), p• 158. 
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that ultimately, the enclosures and the values they house 
are no longer viable. So many things have been adjusted 
that they do not fit, become disorderly, and bog 
down. The function, both original and added to, becomes 
lost in the process. Instead of reexamining and revaluing 
what they stand for in light of the present, they surround 
themselves with mystery, with ritual, and with power so 
that the original purpose is lost within the purpose of 
perpetuating the system. The enclosure becomes a law unto 
itself. As Gibson Winter has pointed out, we maintain our 
nuclear weapons but no longer know why. There is no mes­
sage any more, only the medium.̂  
Art, originally intended as man's attempt to inquire 
into the meaning of the world, has evolved into art as 
things that hang on the walls of museums.2 In this sense, 
art no longer functions as a method of inquiry. It is an 
object for adoration. We do not go to "The Night Watch" 
and wonder about the people of the drama company whose por­
traits are before us. Rather, the little girl has become 
the embodiment of a technique, the affirmation of Rembrandt's 
use of light. She and the others are no longer people who 
lived and moved and spoke. They are a Rembrandt hanging on 
a wall. 
'̂'Community and Education." 
2Malraux, The Voices of Silence, p. 1̂ . 
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Education as a soapbox for advancing political ideolo­
gies* an organization for socializing people into a culture, 
and a means for ensuring that the elite perpetuate them­
selves has subdivided itself into obsolescence. It is ob­
ject, a stylized, captured version, existing without move­
ment, of its own self. This view of education may be capa­
ble of explaining existing things to us, but it is incapable 
of creating new entities. Incapable of metamorphosizing, 
it becomes an imitation and, therefore, its own end, the 
last wall on the building. 
The problem is not that there are containers nor even 
that there are multiple containers. The problem seems to 
lie in that too many containers cease to reveal and begin 
to conceal. They become just a place to go to, a shelter. 
They are the furnished souls in which the Cambridge Ladies 
live. 
Perhaps we've spent so long separating out and gather­
ing in possessions that we no longer know how to turn in­
side out, to free all that we are and were and interact 
with all that we might be. Henry Moore's sculpture is one 
way of turning boxes inside out. Moore creates large 
Stonehenge-like structures through which one can walk 
around and among, relating to the sculpture internally 
without being internally enclosed. There are no walls and 
doors, and yet, there is separation of inner space from 
outer space. 
7^ 
Alexander Calder*s mobiles are another way of re-
conceiving the universe. Calder takes cut-out metal shapes, 
arranges them in clusters and connects the clusters by thin 
i. 
wires in such a manner that he defines space without taking 
up space. The shimmering mechanical forms, because they are 
in constant motion, give us a sense of depth without solid­
ity, shape without mass. Their movement is a function of 
the wind's movement and, at the same time, a function of 
their own construction. The question then becomes, is the 
mobile another form of the wind rearranged, or is the wind 
but a mechanical arrangement? Inner space and outer space 
are one and the same for Calder. To turn boxes inside out 
is to reconceive the universe. 
To extend reality, therefore, requires a different 
perspective. In the Third World countries, we have attempt­
ed to give people instruments of modern technology and then 
we stand amazed that they do not themselves become modern. 
The problem is that Mthe instruments of modern science 
derive from its theory and require a comprehension of that 
theory for their correct manufacture or effective use."̂ -
One cannot make use of something without first grasping its 
mentality. To extend reality, therefore, requires a dif­
ferent way of thinking. 
I once thought the solution was to go back to the 
iHeisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, p. 2. 
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original function. However, no matter how many annexes we 
tear down, the landscape has been changed by them and can 
never attain its original look. Because the past is always 
viewed from the present, it is colored by the way we see 
the present. We can never again view the past as it was 
viewed in the past. I can never see the Greek gods as 
Homer saw them because my God has enfolded them and admitted 
them into a world in a far different context than what Homer 
had in mind. Zeus and Apollo cannot live as separate enti­
ties for me because I have given them a different name and 
they are one. I cannot undo that knowing that they are one. 
Even though it may be possible to speculate that there 
is a universal source, that the creative process in the 
human mind, the developmental process in organic nature, 
and the basic laws of the inorganic realm may be but varia­
tions on a universal formative process, looking for a single 
source is not what is lacking. Science can probably ulti­
mately provide us with an answer to the structure of the 
universe. What is lacking is not the solution but, as 
Heisenberg states it, "a consciousness of the qualitative 
uniqueness of human life.It is not the answer we search 
for but the context in which the answer may operate. 
In short, we can not continue to fix up our enclosures, 
to add to them with single solutions. That will result in 
llbid., pp. 212-213. 
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obsolescence and concealment. Neither can we tear them 
down to what was originally intended. That is impossible. 
The solution may lie in-between, in discovering what is en­
during, what lives and functions in spite of the linear, 
evolutionary time we keep inserting upon it. 
Although "The Night Watch" has been reduced to Rem­
brandt upon the wall, it still lives and it brings a judg­
ment on the quality of the world and the men of the world. 
What has endured is its ability to metamorphosize, to change, 
to remain in constant dialogue with succeeding generations. 
In this sense, what is qualitative within it endures and 
serves as future reflection for succeeding generations. 
Because it promotes change as a metamorphosis, a dialogue 
between what is and was, each time adds onto the other so 
that what evolves is not an elaborate structure of past 
added onto present but the underlying quality that runs 
through all past and present. In this sense, things are 
never lost, they just haven't re-emerged in a qualitative 
form. Dialogue means not that messages live on, but that 
we "bestow messages unknown."* 
To extend reality then is to examine the messages that 
are bestowed unknown. It is to examine both the enclosures 
we have erected as well as our method of erecting those en­
closures with a view towards finding patterns of inter­
relate dness. 
M̂alraux, The Voices of Silence, p. 642. 
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For example, human beings grow quantitatively (in time 
and mass) and qualitatively (through refinement of func­
tions). Not only does the past combine to form the present, 
but also, at each point in that past, the human being is a 
composite personality, influenced by his knowledge, feelings, 
behaviors, all operating in relationship to each other. 
Cognitive development proceeds from pre-operational to con­
crete thinking. Yet, cognitive growth is influenced by 
physical growth. Without the development of motor skills, 
we are unable to crawl, to walk, to come in contact with the 
variety of environments which surround us and, therefore, 
our understanding is limited to those few things with which 
we have come in contact. Likewise, cognitive growth is in­
fluenced by emotional growth. We need a sense of ourselves, 
a perspective on our feelings before we are ready to ex­
plore the source of those feelings. Thus, not only is 
growth continuous and sequential, it is also multidimen­
sional. Its development cannot be charted on a line be­
cause, if it is, we lose that multidimensional quality. 
Because we are human beings who develop in response to indi­
vidual needs as well as to the world and people around , 
us, to examine that human is to examine intersections, 
patterns of construction making visible that which is con­
cealed. It is to ask where does subject meet object and 
environment meet person, where does art influence science 
and science influence art, where does the past become a 
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reflection for the future and the future become a source 
for continuing in the present? The question is, where does 
the warp join the woof and how does it become stronger for 
that joining? 
To examine metaphors from such a perspective requires 
one's presence. It requires the realization that the indi­
vidual human is the context through which the metaphor oper­
ates, that man is the network through which the symbols 
find meaning. The story of the metaphor is not told until 
the individual adds to that story, until he enters his life 
into the life of the metaphor, until he allows it to have 
meaning through him. 
To conceive of disciplines then as metaphor is to in­
quire into our reactions to the universe through aesthetic 
awareness. By examining the structures we have imposed on 
reality, we are examining who we are. In this sense, we 
are conceiving of the individual life itself as metaphor, a 
constant cumulative choice. Man as a participant in meta­
morphosis, returns the forms of the past to life. He opens 
himself to being aestheticized rather than anaesthetized. 
He also rattles around like a fragment of angry candy. 
The following is a participation in metamorphosis. The 
enclosures I use to tell my stories are mythical. They are 
the settings in which I have lived. At the same time, they 
are figments of my imagination. The actual setting itself 
has been interpreted and reconstructed because it has been 
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reflected through the lens of my enclosure, ray experience of 
being in the world. My purpose is neither to set up a pro­
gram nor a utopia. It is merely to clarify my priorities 
and directions, to find new ways of looking at the programs 
we have by examining the patterns they make. To look at 
those patterns is to look at the diagonals, those things 
which build bridges between the diverse selves of this 
world and the diverse ideas which we call our systems of 
knowledge and learning. It is also to ask what those pat­
terns have to say about our gathering new patterns for 
living. 
Patterns of Naming 
Metaphors then are hinges, holding us to­
gether in a tenuous world. Linking the two separate sides 
of our thought, "which yet . . . may communicate the one 
with the other,the metaphor brings together man as in­
quirer and the world as that into which we inquire. Be­
cause the metaphor is the bridge, the diagonal, its essence 
is not to be found in substance. Remove a hinge from a door 
and it is but a circular piece of metal. As Cassirer ex­
plains, a metaphor isn't a copy of the world but a way of 
looking at the world. Words have no meaning except the 
meaning we give them. Reality cannot be found in the 
Êlizabeth Sewell, To Be a True Poem (Winston-Salem, 
N.C.i Hunter Publishing Company, 1979), p« 17 • 
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substance of "*Twas brillig, and the slithy toves / Did gyre 
and gimble in the wabe.It is rather found in the connec­
tions we make of them. In this sense, each metaphor is but 
a "different indication of reality and the only difference 
between them is that their indications possess a different 
value, a different theoretical significance, and mode of 
universality."2 
So it is not substance we are looking for but relation­
ship, the way things function. If we take a hinge and place 
it on a door, then it is the pivot point through which and 
by which our lives find passage. This movement, this abili­
ty to give passage is the essence of the metaphor. 
The function of the metaphor then is to act as a hinge, 
to hold dialectics in place. Its inception is based upon 
both intuition and logic. As a writer, I do not suddenly 
pluck words out of the air. Each word I choose has its own 
history of connections which I must intuitively hold in 
place. As Steven Pepper explains, each word is but an end 
point in a strand and therefore it can evoke many meanings. 
Thus, we choose those words intuitively, but, at the same 
time, we logically organize them, deciding where each strand 
fits into the meaning, considering chronology, juxtaposition,' 
L̂ewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and 
Through the Looking Glass (Londom J.M. Dent & Sons, 195*0. 
p. 129. 
2Cassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, pp. 20-32. 
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fatness balanced against lean.l The power to communicate 
is dependent upon harmony and contrast) that it supply us 
with confirmation, i.e., communicate, and, at the same time9 
give to that communication elaboration, i.e., that it re­
main ambiguous, like the firefly at night whose presence we 
know and yet that knowing is only temporary, for on the 
morning it will be a small brown bug chained by gravity to 
the grass, bushes, and trees. 
The metaphor itself is but indicative of the texture 
of life with its complements and contradictions, its inde­
pendence and interdependence, its search for differentia­
tion and unity, its world in which opposites are constantly 
pulling at us. Man, set free in a world that makes it im­
possible for him to ever fully realize that freedom depends 
upon the flexibility and resilience of the metaphors to re­
solve his dilemma. It is not that he learns to choose one 
over the other, for the system admits both, but that he 
learns to resolve one with another. In that function he 
not only confirms his life but elaborates on it, gives it 
depth and breadth. 
The following then are dialectics upon which metaphors 
are based. The important thing is not what they have to 
say about themselves, what kind of bridge they are. An art 
Ŝteven Fepper, Aesthetic Quality (New Yorki Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1937;, pp. 118-120. 
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object itself holds no special power. It cannot make us 
see thingsi it can only provide opportunities that we might 
see things. A book cannot make us readi it can only pro­
vide material through which we might learn to read. A meta­
phor cannot force us to chooses it can only provide oppor­
tunities that we might choose. Like the hinge on the door, 
it opens only if the human being engages that hinge. 
83 
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Diagonals 
At the same time we name the metaphor, it names us. 
A goose-eyed dragon raised its head the other day. 
It was startled by my presence. Its eyes were wide, 
in awe of the world, as if astonished by everything. 
It did not seem strange that I met this dragon even 
though I knew evolution had killed them all. 
Adolescence is a time of becoming and holding on. Not 
yet allowed to participate in autonomous decisions, we hold 
on to the comfort of our fairy tales. There is a pot of 
Oi 
gold at the end of every rainbow. At the same time, rain­
bows are only refractions of light and we make our own pots 
of gold. In adolescence, we test all that has gone before 
against predictions of what will in the future be. Thus, at 
any moment, we are able to operate both intuitively and 
logically. We are imaginative beings who reach out to name 
the world through metaphors and color that naming with the 
logic and rationale of all that we encounter. In an at­
tempt to singularly explain the world, to put our hand on 
ordering it, we also name ourselves. In asserting our 
humanness, we are made to identify who we are in relation 
to the world. 
Kant has explained this process by saying the world is 
both that which is created (the stuff of the universe) and 
that which we create (the intuitions, the examinations, the 
critical evaluations we bring to this stuff in an attempt 
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to become one with its substance).* We go to meet the world 
and seek to understand its meaning. Because we are Plato's 
man in the cave, we do not understand what reality is. What 
is a fish? It is an object to be labeled and categorized 
and that is the end of that? Or does it have meaning beyond 
that reduced definition? Can within it be found the laws 
of harmony and the nature of the universe? These are possi­
bilities for what that object called fish means. No matter 
how we choose to interpret it, to make sense out of it, to 
create some order, some semblance, we, in choosing to inter-
pret it, are giving it a name. Thus, the world is both 
what it is (objective) and, because we choose what to look 
at and how to look at it, the world is also what we make of 
it (subjective). 
In this sense, both the objects of the world and we as 
choosing beings in that world come into being. When we 
choose to name the world through a metaphor, then that 
metaphor is colored by all that we are and were, by our 
past experiences, our social circumstances, and our genetic 
distribution which precedes any of these. The happenings, 
the surroundings of my life, come to me and I filter them 
through my own set of circumstances, the social class in 
which I live, the things I have encountered previously. 
Îmmanuel Kant, "A Theory of Aesthetic Judgment» Prom 
The Critique of Judgment." in Aesthetics, eds. George 
Dickie and Richard J. Sclafani (New Yorki St. Martin's 
Press, 1977)t PP« 660-661. 
86 
Each new piece of information is somehow stored in the brain 
and I build up a hierarchy of what I think. Thus, each new 
piece of information changes not only the structure of that 
thinking but its attitude as well.* My choosing is both a 
fact about reality and a fact about myself, about how I 
perceive reality. The Tightness or wrongness can't be 
established. All that can be established is whether my 
fact is someone else's fact.2 Thus, in our effort to com­
prehend, to add to our consciousness, that consciousness 
has come into being. Man separated from the animals by his 
ability to think and know, fulfills his role of being human 
in his attempt to think and know. He is neither the source 
nor the observer. He is the "measure of all things."3 
Ren§ Dubos in A God Within explains this process by 
saying that what we become is determined by the quality of 
our experiences while, at the same time, we operate on the 
world and reflect on it the quality of our vision. In this 
sense man is both independent/interdependent. He is a 
choosing being, directing the spirit within and, at the 
same time* he seeks within that choosing to be in harmony 
Ĥarold Rugg, Imagination (New Yorki Harper & Row, 
1963). p. 53. 
2Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (Chicagoi The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 305. 
3Robert M. Prisig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Main­
tenance (New Yorki William Morrow & Co., 19741 Bantam 
Books, 1975)» P« 368. 
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with the universal laws that operate within all our lives.̂  
This business of education then is not communication 
in the sense of presenting objects which are stylized, cap­
tured versions of life, displayed in a textbook for edifica­
tion. If communication is our only objective, this assumes, 
like Plato, that there is an ideal form of reality, that the 
objects and situations of the world only imitate this reali­
ty, and that man can only imitate or translate the imitation. 
In other words, God created tables, lamps, and chairs and it 
is our business to find out what he meant by those tables, 
lamps, and chairsj that is, man can only use those tables, 
lamps, and chairs. He cannot improve upon them, improvise 
upon them, nor reconstruct them. In this sense, there is 
no bridge, no way to work ourselves into the pattern. Per­
haps ultimately we would be able to use the objects of the 
world to explain existing things, but never would we be 
able to create new entities. Life would be a closed system, 
feeding upon itself, pushing and shoving, so that, ultimate­
ly, we would use all the blues and yellows, all the hues, 
never realizing that blue can be added to yellow and we get 
a new entity, green. Life is not imitation. It is imagi­
nation. We name the world and it names us. 
•̂Rene J. Dubos, A God Within (New Yorkj Charles 
Scribner*s Sons, 1972), pp. 4-3-̂ . 
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At the same time the metaphor is permanent, it is also ever 
subject to change. 
His search had been for imagination, he said, to 
sail in and out of years and over days and at the 
end of his sailing to say he had seen the world 
in a grain of mustard seed. But the voices spoke, 
you are not yet ready. You must be tested and 
proven worthy. And so, he was put in the Waiting 
Room, a place apart, a holding room for baggage. 
This setting called school is our gymnasium, the enclo­
sure in which we stretch our capacities, flex our abilities, 
and give our performances. The question is, is this a re­
hearsal or a performance. To conceive of school as rehear­
sal is to conceive of one kind of metaphors knowledge is 
automated, there is order, the disciplines are separate, 
children are dealt with in groups and in logical order. In 
the Waiting Room, school is rehearsal. Children are but 
"markers in the presentation of an idea."* 
There was no name on the door, just the number 
311• The radiators creaked and never seemed to 
heat up until 2»30. The long row of windows had 
been painted so many times that they would no 
longer open, trapping on the other side of their 
glass the cherry blossoms that would brush by in 
the spring. Within the confines of these four 
walls were chairs and desks from school surplus, 
each of a different design, each with a different 
degree of discomfort. Into this ageing and per­
haps no longer relevant place entered thirty-five 
boys and girls each day to spend a great deal of 
their lives and to form a great many of the ideas 
that would shape their lives in the future. 
Do we assimilate or do we choose is the question. Are 
adolescents forced into tracts that will soon be obsolete, 
iDidion, The White Album, p. 120. 
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groomed for a kind and level of consumption, bombarded with 
material that is something apart from life rather than some­
thing integral to life? Does transmitting the curriculum 
become more important than promoting the student's growth 
and development? Are we stuck in this Waiting Room, this 
imperfect perfect processing, where everything runs smooth­
ly because there is no human factor? Or, is there a way to 
open the windows, to invite exploration, to conceive of re­
hearsal as performance? Can we conceive of school as part 
of life rather.than what prepares us for life? 
Alfred North Whitehead in his work Process and Reality 
answered these questions by stating that the world is ever 
open to change. It is new each moment. At the same time, 
the new derives its rightness from its inheritance. Accord­
ing to Whitehead, life flows around us at all times, both 
those forces we attend to and those that we don't. Just 
because we don't notice the colors of the sunset doesn't 
mean that they aren't there. It means our consciousness 
hasn't inserted order onto that flux. When we do insert 
order, what we are doing is choosing out of the sensations 
that surround us. We attend to some things, give them a 
name, a meaning, and they become permanent. However, this 
permanence is ever open to change, to escaping back into 
the flux. Because those other forces, as yet unnamed, still 
exist, they are the possibilities for our future ordering 
and thus change of that which we now consider permanent. 
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The world is ever permanent and, at the same time, subject 
to change. 
A child looks at a coloring book and knows the color 
yellow. But, the yellow of the coloring book is not the 
yellow of the yellow brick road, nor the yellow of the 
"Tiger, tiger burning bright / In the forests of the night,"2 
nor even the yellow of the lights on the Christmas tree. He 
has snatched yellow out of the flux of sensation that meets 
him every day and given it a permanent name, but that per­
manence is ever subject to future reflection such as the 
magic that he will come to know when the Wizard of Oz enters 
his life and yellow stands against a brick road. 
To participate in permanence and flux is to realize 
that the rehearsal is the performance, that living calls 
for comment, for rationalization, for re-construction and 
re-organization. If the new is to derive its Tightness 
from its inheritance, then patterns must be woven, things 
that exist but haven't yet been called into consciousness 
must be , rediscovered, and understanding must be redefined 
to include reaching out and forming such relationships. If 
there is action and participation, then life flows not only 
around but also through. 
Âlfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New Yorki 
The Macmillan Co., 1929? The Humanities Press, 1957), pp. 
2william Blake, "The Tyger," in The Poems of William 
Blake, ed. W. H. Stevenson, text by David V. Erdman (London» 
Longman Group Ltd., 1977)» lines 1-2, p. 156. 
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To look at schools from such a perspective is to think 
of them in terms of processes rather than products. It is 
not enough to catalogue existing school practices and then 
draw parallel lines to hoped-for new orders. Both must go 
forth to meet each other. Theory must be willing to under­
go practice, knowing that in the process it will "be modi­
fied, and practice must subject itself to re-evaluation, 
knowing that only those elements which have quality will 
survive. Somehow, the conclusions I have managed to wrestle 
forth must be brought to bear on the real life practice of 
a school situation in such a way that the vividness inherent 
in the ideas and the school situation live on. 
It is in this reaching out to one another that a pat­
tern is woven. The warp and the woof have integrity be­
cause of the way they stand together at the moment, but 
they also have timelessness because they are a point of de­
parture for the weaving of future patterns. Because the 
pattern is open-ended, designed so that many other view­
points may work themselves in, the total picture will ulti­
mately be one of many interpretations, each expanding, ex­
ploring, redefining the other. Within the context of the 
present, we form the future. The rehearsal is the perfor­
mance . 
At worst, the Waiting Room can be a place for baggage 
in limbo. At best, it can be a small place in a small 
society where people encounter people and in that encounter 
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add unto each other's lives. 
At the same time the metaphor makes the strange familiar, 
it makes the familiar strange7 
Now in this land, the air was drowsy with the 
murmur of bees and helicopters, and life flowed 
around but never through. And yet, if one 
listened, he could hear in the distance the 
mynah bird and its piercing call to Attention! 
Attention! 
Someone once said that our lives are so prepackaged 
that we no longer have to get homesick. How we assemble, 
how we move, how we meet each other, how we live our lives 
and in what buildings we live those lives have, to a great 
extent, become preprogrammed and lead to what Christopher 
Lasch describes in The Culture of Narcissism̂  as unreflecting 
egoism. So overwhelmed by our powerlessness, we surround 
ourselves with counselors, psychologists, and consultants, 
so that not only do we buy a correct set of behaviors from 
them, but also we buy from them our fashions, make-up, even 
our mode of employment. Because of this collective narcis­
sism, we have come to fear others who do not conform. Their 
achievements threatens their failures extend our superiori­
ty. Unable to make meaning for ourselves, we hide behind 
anxious preoccupation. Such is the substance of self-
consciousness described by Lasch. Pursuing such a life is, 
as Kierkegaard said, like reading a book during the 
(̂New Yorki W.W. Norton & Co., 1979.) 
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afternoon nap.* It calls for no comment, no action, no 
thought. We are but lulled by the murmur of bees and heli­
copters. 
And yet, in the background there is a mynah bird and 
his incessant call to attention, attention, is discordant, 
disruptive. 
On the island of Maui in the Hawaiian chain rises a 
gigantic crater called Haleakala. Rising more than 10,000 
feet above sea level, and extending for more than seven 
miles, the terrain is barren and void of life forms except 
for a single plant called the silversword. This plant, its 
beauty awesome against the starkness of the red clay and 
black molten lava, is found only on these slopes of Hale­
akala. Its blossoms come into being only once every seven 
years, as if it were taking that long to physically draw 
sustenance from this barren ground. To contemplate the 
moment of blooming is to lose one's self in a timeless 
realm. Although the body grows older and the cells contin­
ue to die, the senses are no longer locked in that dimen­
sion. They are one with the sounds, smells, and sights of 
the crater called Haleakala and they have looked on it with 
new eyes. 
Somehow the beauty of the silversword does not belong 
on the barren slopes of Haleakala. The unconscious can't 
Q̂uoted in Rollo May, The Courage to Create (New Yorks 
W.W. Norton & Co., 1975f Bantam Books, 1976}, p. 101. 
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assimilate that conscious seeing. Somehow it does not fit. 
A sense of order is destroyed. My sense of what I am and 
what the world is have become threatened. The forms that 
have so far been my guide are no longer valid and I must now 
seek other guides. These guides are ones which admit the 
beauty of the silversword on a barren slope, which tell us 
that life is contained in death and death in life, that 
fire belongs to ice as ice belongs to fire. In this place 
where contradictions are allowed to exist, that which was 
strange, the silversword, is now familiar, and that which 
was familiar, my life, is now strange. 
Picasso has described this metaphorical process in 
terms of art works. He says that "Art is a lie that makes 
us realize the truth."* It is the window into other ways 
of thinking. Jackson Pollock takes dabs of paint and drops 
them one by one onto a canvas, creating an overlapping web 
of surfaces. This painting has nothing to do with my time 
nor my space. It is a lie, something that hangs on the 
walls of a museum simply because someone forgot to take it 
down. And yet, Pollock's work is not a lie. Within the 
overlapping of webs is a pattern, an archaeological config­
uration. Each layer records a time lapse. Each swirl, com­
pact and dense, records an energy which is restless, 
trapped. The resulting feeling is that there is a pattern 
•̂ Quoted in Robert M. Piatt, The I-Opener (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey* Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 190. 
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to this compounded complexity. Void of object and people, 
PcflJock's paintings deal with the residue of those people, 
the statistical pattern of the way things move. The recog­
nition is that reality is no longer about people but about 
the statistics they make, the numbers they add up to, and 
the government programs that are based upon those figures. 
Because Pollock calls our attention, at first through rage, 
perhaps, he gives us new constructs, new consciousnesses to 
consider. He renders the commonplace visible by showing it 
in an unfamiliar light. Because of his metaphor, routine 
associations are broken and novel, astonishing ones are put 
in their place. Pollock gives us a new language, a new 
image to compare with our own ideas and in whose terms we 
may judge our own lives. We ate no longer consumers, selec­
ting among moral styles, but people creating values of 
our own. 
The experience of the silversword is a transcendent one, 
but is not an end unto itself. It is, rather, the means 
whereby we evaluate and attempt to rectify the everyday 
occurrences of our lives. At the same time we seek to 
transcend the world, it is always to the lived situation 
that that transcendence refers. To climb Mt. Haleakala and 
see the silversword bloom against the barrenness of the red 
clay is to contemplate the promise that man holds in this 
often hostile environment called earth. 
The problem with seeing the strange as familiar and 
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the familiar as strange is that we are stuck in our single 
tracks. A man-centered world has been replaced by a tech­
nology-centered one. Each thus goes its own way, man never 
realizing that technology has the power to bring grace to 
his life, and technology never acknowledging that it is the 
human imagination that enables us to construct new ways of 
living. As a result of this separation, our educational 
systems have also become fragmented. Days are divided into 
specific periods. Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet is sifted 
out for its theme, plot, characterization, and was Shake­
speare really Shakespeare. Curricular attempts at reintegra­
tion seem to have fallen short of the task. CEMREL has 
developed a program that uses art as the basic curriculum.* 
CEMREL*s program studies several disciplines by focusing on 
the artistic elements inherent within them. However, it 
does not take into account the social and political milieu 
in which the disciplines were formed. USMES has developed 
a program that integrates science and mathematics by focus­
ing on practical solutions to everyday problems.2 Exclu­
ded, however, is the use of imaginative play around problems 
that do not exist. Even the program as described in Elaine 
Ŝtanley S. Madeja and Shelia Onuska, Through the Arts 
to the Aesthetici The CEMREL Aesthetic Education Curriculum 
(St. Louis, Missourii CEMREL, 1977). 
2»»uSMES, A Step Toward an Integrated Curriculum," 
Learning 2 (January, 1974). 
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Flory Fisher's Aesthetic Awareness and the Child1 seems 
fragmented. Fisher uses as her basis a metaphor such as 
light and explores it through all the disciplines. This, 
however, makes light, or the particular metaphor, more im­
portant than the medium in which it is encased. Because 
each is a specific plan, it is but a fragment of all possi­
ble plans. Believing things can not exist of their own 
free will, we make plans for them so that not only are each 
of these modes inclusive, each is imposed from outside* It 
is as if we English teachers have already finished Romeo and 
Juliet and have now packaged it and are presenting it for 
digestion. However, the gift of knowing is something that 
comes from within. It is man's conscious effort to make 
sense out of the world. Thus, technique alone will not do 
because such technique ignores man as spirit, that irration­
al, intuitive being who is able to hold knowledge in per­
spective . 
All of this is not to say throw technique away. It is 
the computer that saves us hours in programming. It is the 
teacher how-to manual that gives us a focus for our ideas, 
that gives us something to interact with. It is rather to 
say, put technique in its place. Take those identified ele­
ments and use them so that they work for us. If we look at 
(̂Itasca, Illinois! F.E. Peacock Publishers, 1978.) 
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a painting by Georges Seurat, his technique of pointillisme 
is fascinating. To put a tiny dot of blue against a tiny 
dot of green and achieve an overall effect of shading is 
awesome* If we become stuck in those dots, however, we 
miss the serenity of "Sunday Afternoon on the Island of La 
Grande Jatte.M We never get beyond the time of the object 
to moving to the time of being on a river bank on a Sunday 
afternoon in the 1800*s. Always technique must stand in 
relation to the lived situation. With each reading there 
is a new Romeo and Juliet because with each reading we are 
a new person. 
As Herbert Read has pointed out, somehow we have lost 
our perceptive ability. We use our eyes to read, walk, get 
from here to there, but not to visually explore the world, 
to see patterns in the snow, to contemplate essences.1 
Somehow, we fail to look at Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet 
from the sociology of suicide, the psychology of the ado­
lescent, the historical perspective of the science of herbs, 
the mathematics of probability (two opposing forces, two 
complementary forces, and one outside force). We look at 
things intact but somehow we forget to view them in relation 
to one another. We call on science to solve pollution when 
pollution is related to sociology, economy, and politics. 
-̂Herbert Read, The Form of Things Unknown (New Yorki 
Horizon Press, i960), p. 46. 
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We are Col. Deja on Huxley's Island,1 protecting our single 
modes of thought. The artist demands ambiguity. The sci­
entist demands accountability. Unable to perceive of art 
reaching out to science or of science contemplating art, we 
focus on only half of the world, our own half. We are un­
able to hear the mynah bird call attention, unable to 
respond precisely to whatever life has to offer. 
The question then is how do we regain our perceptive 
ability. How do we call for the transcendent moment in 
which the familiar becomes strange and the strange familiar, 
and how do we then use that knowledge to enhance our future 
knowing? 
And so, on a warm spring afternoon, he went to 
the Academy of Sciences. He saw the fish and 
the birds and the Progress of Man rooms and he 
asked again what Kant meant when he said, "There 
are two things worth noting in this universe / 
Both the starry heavens above and the moral law 
within." 
Kant spoke those words above long ago in a forgotten 
context and yet they have been preserved, enmeshed in brass 
over the door of the Academy of Sciences Museum in San 
Francisco's Golden Gate Park. These words are no transitory 
slogan, put there to catch one's attention. Rather, they 
are a deep commitment, a moral imperative. Their message 
is do not dissect, sterilize, reduce nature, but stand in 
awe of it, seek harmony with its brilliance, and learn from 
3(London» Chatto & Windus, 1962.) 
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its ways. 
In the Kantian sense, each symbol structure has its 
own form. Numbers do not take on a new meaning in a poem 
because they belong to a mathematical symbol system. Musi­
cal notation in the midst of a chemical formula would be 
meaningless. Symbols themselves are not transferable from 
one system to another. They communicate precisely because 
they remain within their own system and because they con­
form to their own inherent laws. 
However, at the same time that each discipline has its 
own symbol structure, the things that symbols do are trans­
ferable from one system to another. Symbols set up relation­
ships by drawing attention to stress, intensity, and spread. 
These ways of ordering repeat themselves in more than one 
aspect of our lives. While a musical note makes little 
sense in a written composition, the musical ideas of alli­
teration, onomatopoeia, glide, staccato are all part of the 
word structures we call poems. "He gives his harness bells 
a shake / To ask if there*s been some mistake / The only 
other sound's the sweep / Of easy wind and downy flake. 
It is possible to take these lines by Frost and convert them 
into a picture, a musical composition, or a mathematical for­
mula. The cadence is the same in all four. It plods along, 
has no conclusion, but has multiple repercussions. 
R̂obert Frost, "Stopping by Woods 
in The Poetry of Robert Frost, lines 9-: 
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There seems to be a universal which overrides all forms. 
Perhaps that universal is man himself. If each symbol sys­
tem is but a human construct, man*s attempt to name himself 
and his world, then it is in this reaching out to join ob-
nect, nature, and human spirit that man creates new frames 
of reference. He brings forth new possibilities, both for 
himself, and for the world from which all selves stem. He 
fulfills that moral law within. 
To evoke that universal, to learn from its ways is, 
therefore, to stand in relationship to it. It is to trans­
pose onto our way of looking other ways of looking. It is 
to take gross anatomy, dissection, cross section, and look 
at art. It is to take color, line, and form and look at 
science. It is to paint big when we want to stay within 
the lines, and it is to pull in the reins when we want to 
go flying through the woods. It is to make the strange 
familiar and the familiar strange. 
Such a relationship is the relationship of diagonals. 
To hear the distant sounds of two different melodies, 
played simultaneously, in opposition to each other, is to 
be nourished by a harmony in their tension. It is to be an 
individual in a present time frame and one of men, in har­
mony with the history of other men. It is to be an artist-
scientist, acknowledging that while our apprehension depends 
upon intuition and feeling, it is cognitive knowledge which 
gives those feelings structure, which demands a critical 
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examination and evaluation. It is not so much that the 
metaphor enables us to come in touch with something out 
there as it is that it enables us to become conscious of the 
moral law that exists in the fabric of us all, the eternal 
circle of which we are one. 
The world is in a grain of mustard seed, if we 
but engage the hinge. Imagination dwells within. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONFIGURATIONS OP LEARNING 
Voices 
To look at any thing 
If you would know that thing, 
You must look at it longi 
To look at this green and say 
•I have seen spring in these 
Woods,* will not do—you must 
Be the thing you sees 
You must be the dark snakes of 
Stems and ferny plumes of leaves, 
You must enter in 
To the small silences between 
The leaves, 
You must take your time 
And touch the very peace 
They issue from. 
John Moffitt, "To Look At Any Thing"*'' 
Our lives respond to many voices, both inward and out­
ward. The spoken voice is sent forth so that others may 
understand. The imaginative voice takes within so that we 
may understand. Some voices seek to communicate, to estab­
lish order. Some seek to express, to open feelings. And, 
there are voices which seek none of the above? they are 
simply spoken out of habit. As Irwin Edman points out, 
each voice is a strand, a thread of thought and carries 
-̂Reflections on a Gift of Watermelon Pickle, comp. 
Stephen Cunning, Edward Lueders, and Hugh Smith (New Yorki 
Lothrop, Lee & Shepard Co., 1967), p. 21. 
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within it, its own context, its own sum of histories.1 
These voices, as well as their textures, are the means 
whereby we learn. To understand them it is not possible to 
untwist single threads of thought, to trace where they lead 
in isolation, because they do not function in isolation. 
As Polanyi has pointed out, looking at bricks in a building 
is not the same thing as perceiving the building.̂  A melo­
dy is more than four notes played on a piano, and a design 
is more than the single threads of that design. It is the 
inner-connectedness of notes that creates the melody, the 
threads placed in relationship to each other that create 
the design. 
A jigsaw puzzle sits on the table. One thousand 
pieces are scattered between the sand and coffee cups. The 
design is a mosaic, one of those without association. Nancy 
is a cause-and-effect person. She works on the border 
first. Keith, her son, begins with an identifiable piece 
and works his way out. Craig, who can't seem to sustain a 
single thought for more than five seconds, sits on the floor, 
separating pieces according to color. Mary Margaret, how­
ever, will have nothing to do with the whole thing. Perhaps 
she knows that, when finally completed, it will simply be 
shellacked and put away on the shelf, on top of last year's 
lArts and the Man (New Yorki W.W. Norton & Co., 1928), 
p. 62. 
2The Tacit Dimension, p. 35. 
106 
seascape, awaiting next year's monochrome. 
Because learning is an active verb, something that 
humans do, not something that is done to them, learning is 
a divergent process. We go out to meet the world and we 
interpret each set of experiences in accordance with our 
unique past history of experiences, our particular vantage 
point of the moment and our own will to be. 
Because these variables are unique to the individual, 
we have different ways of going about things. We attack 
puzzles differently, we perceive buildings differently, and 
we respond to voices differently. Because learning embraces 
many styles, many ways of knowing, both within the indivi­
dual and from individual to individual, learning can't be 
confined to any one style, any one way of knowing. Right-
left brain studies which attempt to pinpoint the physical 
location of our mental activities separate the physical 
from the mental and, at the same time, use left-brain 
methods to study right-brain functions. Whatever conclu­
sions therefore are drawn are simply not applicable. Thus, 
convergent learning, divergent learning, imitation, emotion, 
logic, intuition, the you that speaks, the I that listens, 
the me that functions through habit, they are all part of 
the learning process. To look at them is not to trace them 
out to cause and effect, to input and output, or to physical/ 
mental dichotomies. They are all a piece of it. To know 
them, we must look at their innerconnectedness, the 
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combinations they make, the pacing and interval, the inten­
sity and spread, how they stand one against another. To 
know a thing, we must look at the small silences between 
the leaves. 
Knowledge then in the aesthetic sense is not absolute 
but relative to time, place, and human intentions. Its 
edges are not hard but soft, malleable, bending, and perme­
able. Like the marble that stains, the crystal that admits 
light, and the transit of Venus that sifts across our sys­
tem, so too do our lives intersect and blend, one with an­
other, and one with the universe from which we stem. This 
method of blending, yet still retaining integrity, the I 
joining the me, the you, and the Thou is what we call learn­
ing. Both incomplete and incompletable, it is but a process 
in which we go out to form relationships and get into con­
figurations . 
The Soliloquy 
Learning begins with the single isolated strand of the 
I, the person in the process of coming to know. Because 
truth isn't something out there but something we construct 
through interpreting experience, coming to know is a per­
sonal thing. "What /man/ « • . inquires into is not the 
nature of the physical world but the nature of our reactions 
to it."1 We bring to every situation our own biography, 
Ê.H. Gombrich, quoted in Sewell. The Human Metaphor. 
p. 67. 
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our own cognitive style* our own agenda and method of clari­
fying that agenda. Then we filter every experience through 
that being so that ultimately, "the knower can't be separa­
ted from the known."1 
So, the I joins the me, what other people shape us as, 
and the first knot is tied in the design. We interpret 
life in terms of what has been, the time and situation of 
our past, the communal and social framework out of which we 
come. Reading words is not just words, but knowing words 
from experience, from historical, social contexts. The 
stored experiences of the past shape the way we think. At 
the same time, we interpret in terms of what is to come, 
inferring a future from these stored experiences as well as 
from our own being, our own desires. Our nature and history 
are both the way and the why we communicate with the world. 
The I and the me are opposing forces on either side of 
the diagonal. They are the positive and negative changes. 
In their tension, they create a harmony. To favor one over 
another is to lose that balance, to live one's life in the 
prologue. The X, unable to look critically at the me, what 
other people shape us as, turns into a clichS, a chosen 
being rather than a choosing being, one who depends upon 
social formulae to direct their lives. Joan Didion explains 
the Women's Movement in these terms. She says the movement 
P̂olanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 299. 
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is simply a made-up Marxian social class. Its function is 
not to bring self-reliance to women but to be a platform, a 
cause behind which women can live. By reducing woman to 
everywoman, failure or success belongs to the movement, not 
to the individual woman.̂  We are human beings first. The 
categories may overlap but they are not the same. 
At the same time, the I, unable to admit the me, un­
able to see other objects as connected with who we are, re­
treats further and further into personalism, the power of 
war, the glory of destruction. Continually seeking self-
gratification, imposing his will on the wills of others, 
the I spends his whole life clarifying values rather than 
using values to clarify his life. He is Nathan in William 
Styron's Sophie's Choice.2 Born into a world he did not 
make and certainly did not like, he becomes so wrapped up 
in introspection, in feeling and experiencing the moment, 
that he never has time to grow, to develop. 
The I and the me are opposing forces on either side of 
the diagonal. They are both necessary to ensure that "the 
freedom of the subjective person to do as he pleases is 
over-ruled by the freedom of the responsible person to act 
as he must.N3 
iDidion, The White Album, pp. 109-118. 
2New Yorki Random House, 1979-
3polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 309. 
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Learning then begins with the I, not yet aware that the 
universe is something more than itself and not yet acknowl­
edging the debt that will be owed others. Within this 
prelude, the I is joined by the me, the social, cultural, 
and familiar voices of the past. Ideas are given free 
reign. They move from the complex to the disjointed, not 
sequentially, but spiraling, bending upon one another, seek­
ing wholes where there were only fragmented parts, intuitive­
ly rehearsing what is to be said. In this prelude, the com­
posite I reorders and reconstructs until the ideas come to 
life and demand to be said. The I/me is Michelangelo's 
David, waiting in the stone to be born. The soliloquy is 
the first step in freeing that David. 
The Dialogue 
Then there is speech, an acknowledgment that this 
world is a shared world, that there are many voices which 
help us clarify our existence. Within this realm, messages 
are continually sent forth, brought back, reperceived, and 
then sent forth again in a series of thrusts and counter-
thrusts. The independent strands separate, the shuttle 
moves in and out, the loom tightens, and a pattern of inter­
dependence is woven. 
Dialogue begins with the you, the experiences and 
people of our lives. The pragmatists* knowledge of the 
past, because it has shaped our way of seeing, and the 
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empirical experiences of the present, because they are the 
experiences out of which we choose, are those things we re­
act to and interact with. They, and the people who speak 
of them, are the data which shape our lives. 
At the same time the data shape our lives, we take 
the data within to validate them,by re-interpreting them in 
light of our intentionality. It is here that the intuition 
comes into play. The intuition is our ground, the basis on 
which we judge the parts and their effectiveness. It is 
that which enables us to complete n +r~ +1-**? It is not 
trial and error that allow us to complete equations but 
rather our knowing which is the trial and which the error. 
Within this process, data come in, a shape here, a sound 
there, and the imagination builds onto these images, form­
ing them, as Hugg indicates, into a hierarchical arrange­
ment, taking into account that each perception brings with 
it its own history, its own feeling, until an idea is re-
perceived and sent back in a new form and the process begins 
again.̂  With no real beginning or end, we move outward to 
experience and inward to understand that experience in a 
continual process of clarification and discrimination, ten­
sion and balance. 
Because thinking and learning are dependent upon both 
objective reflection and subjective decision, the I/you 
R̂ugg, Imagination, p. 37. 
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relationship is a complementary/contradictory one. The you 
complements the I in that it brings new perspectives and 
new materials for insight. At the same time, the you is al­
ways at odds with the I, not only because what the you says 
is not always what the I hears, but also because what the I 
is must continually be open to what the you thinks it might 
be. 
The I and you are separate metaphors. They are day 
and night, each contained within itself, still, unproposing-
carrying within them their own set of operations, their own 
feelings and beings. In their effort to communicate, iden­
tity is continually lost and regained, lost and regained, 
each adding to the other, each embracing the other, until, 
just before dawn when neither dark nor light holds court, the 
I and you open themselves to new colors, new possibilities, 
new images. They "mutually confirm each other's being. 
Dialogue then is the bridge which connects the you to 
the I, which weds the personal to the universal. Through 
the continual process of working out, mutually establishing 
relationships between things and persons, truths and mean­
ings, it invisibly bonds us one to another. Its tension 
draws us into the situation, forces us to make our own 
judgments, and also bonds the separate elements together 
into a stronger, more resilient composition. Imagination is 
3-Hill, Education and the Endangered Individual, p. 195* 
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its support, that which allows us to work ourselves in and 
out, to perceive wholistically, to keep the balance between 
intensity and spread. Because dialogue is a bridge, both 
the world and ourselves are transformed by this interaction 
so that "the many are fused, merged, absorbed into the one, 
and the one irridates in the many."1 
Ultimately i/you becomes I/Thou, one voice, one point 
of intersection. It is as if we have seen Michelangelo's 
David for the first time, the crystalized marble, the light 
reflecting off the planes and angles of the face, the 
muscles standing out in relief, and we have lent that David 
our lives, our feelings, our being. The air blows coolly 
on our backs, our legs are frozen in anticipation, we hear 
the sounds of the crowd, we are ready to fight Goliath and 
we know why we fight that Goliath. Because we have engaged 
the metaphor, we have transcended the normal images of our 
lives and are able to see anew what those lives are. The 
quality of the David has contradicted our pedestrian images 
and, at the same time, called out to, or complemented, those 
forces within us that are striving to be like that David. 
In acknowledging a Thou, we are acknowledging the humanness 
of us all. The realization is that we share this world. 
The questions one asks are the questions we all ask. 
Because we are individuals in a present time frame and 
Ipepper, Aesthetic Quality, p. 38. 
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men in harmony with the history of humans, Michelangelo*s 
David is born and he is I and I am he. We have entered the 
small spaces between. 
Human beings, therefore, do not live in isolation but 
are intrinsically bound one to another. Existence is al­
ways in relationship to one another. Whether that relation­
ship is one of harmony or conflict, union or ambivalence, it 
forms a pattern, the configuration of which adds an extra 
dimension to the individual elements. Just as moss and rock 
differ from moss-covered rock, so do I and you differ from 
i/You. Therefore, to see the configurations, to make visi­
ble the interrelationships of the forms, it is necessary to 
look at intersections, the bindings or elements that relate 
us, one to another. As Harold Osborne has explained it, 
The environment is a world of things standing 
out against a formless background and separated 
by empty space. . . . ̂ ow we can7 se© "the fig­
ure or the ground but not both £\mlessJ . . . 
we look at the spaces between as if they were 
shapes formed by figure and ground.! 
To search for imagination is to look in the spaces, 
the holes between the threads that wed figure to ground. 
Ĥarold Osborne, The Art of Appreciation (Londons 
Oxford University Press, 1970;, pp. 194-195. 
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Intersections 
Understanding Through Imagination 
There are one-story intellects, and two-story 
intellects, and three-story intellects with 
skylights. All fact collectors, who have no 
aim beyond their facts, are one-story men. Two-
story men compare, reason, generalize, using 
the labors of the fact collectors as well as 
their own. Three-story men idealize, imagine, 
predict* their best illumination comes from 
above, through the skylight. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, "Skylight"1 
If learning then is establishing relationships, for­
ever working out how we fit into each other's lives, what 
it means to share being human, then that working out is made 
possible through dialogue. According to Feldman, dialogue 
can be neither one-story monologue (impersonal, non-
communicative declarations) nor two-story dramatic presen­
tation (critical analyses with pros and cons already 
established).2 It is, rather, an imaginative process of 
spinning webs, threading networks that connect us one to 
another. 
Because we human beings are intrinsically different, 
we bring different perspectives to each encounter. As 
Polanyi has said, MOur believing is conditioned at its 
Q̂uoted in Fisher, Aesthetic Awareness and the Child. 
p. 296. 
2Edmund B. Feldman, "Engaging Art in Dialogue," in 
Concepts in Art and Education, ed. George Pappas (New Yorki 
Macmillan Company, 1970), pp. 352-353. 
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source by our belonging,"-1- so that both our past associa­
tions as well as our future aspirations differ and these 
differences color the way we perceive each encounter. Fur­
thermore, because learning is an active as opposed to reac­
tive process, what we take in is not simply stored there, 
stacked one beside another, but is reconstructed and then 
sent forth in a new form so that with each word, each 
stroke, the pattern of communication is altered. Each new 
variation stretches the configuration, each new color shades 
the whole, and each encounter thus demands its own present 
tense working out of that encounter. 
Therefore, to link the I to the you, the diverse souls 
which people this world one to another, and to bring into 
consciousness the identification we have with each other, 
require the use of the imagination, that gossamer thin 
binding that draws together the past of things which exist 
but haven't been called into consciousness yet and the 
future of things that are hoped for but have not yet been 
made visible. The imagination is both our memory and our 
hope. Because it allows us to make multiple images, to re­
cast our thoughts in different forms, then we are enabled 
to spin many webs, to see "beyond the sky, inside the 
apple,"2 -the other side of the rainbow. The imagination is 
ipolanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 322. 
2Rugg, Imagination, p. 20. 
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but the passageway between the lived situations of our 
everyday lives and the interpretations of those situations. 
Because it enables us to construct many frames of reference, 
I 
entertain many different perspectives, then we, like the 
web that tolerates the imposition of a branch, that both 
gives and takes from the wind, are enabled to be tolerant 
of others, to give to them understanding and to take from 
them comprehension. Both resilient and binding, imagina­
tion is the hole that weds figure to ground, person to per­
son. It is that which keeps dialogue open. 
To delve into the world of the imagination then is to 
open ourselves to the influence of the web, to be drawn in 
like a fly to its sticky surface and to be enmeshed in 
worlds not yet defined. The web, because it entices, be­
cause it entraps, gives to our existence a sense of the 
problematic. It not only demands our participation but 
also demands elaboration upon that participation. By en­
gaging the imagination, we are allowing ourselves to be 
drawn into the problematic, we are opening our lives to 
questioning. So we poke and probe, drawing forth from 
others both opinions and perspectives that we ourselves are 
unable to see. Thus, with each new construction, we have a 
new set of consequences to examine. Thrown into a world of 
both ambiguity and dreamwork, we find no resolution to the 
dilemmas. There are only ourselves and other, like selves, 
intersecting, making visible the commonalities we share, 
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the meaning of what it is to be human. 
The following is one web, a dialogue between myself 
and other selves. The concerns presented here are problem­
atic , without resolution. And yet, because they touch my 
life, they demand my participation, that I open myself to 
the influence of others and that ultimately I make choices 
on the basis of that influence. 
Imagining 
If you had only one match and entered a room in which there 
was a kerosene lamD. an oil heater, and a wood burning stove, 
which would you light first? 
The world of cause and effect is a deterministic one. 
It has an agreed-upon order which is linear and rational. 
It presumes that ultimately everything will be traceablei 
we will find the reasons behind why we act as we do, why we 
live as we do. Responsibility within such a construct is a 
utilitarian concept* We assume responsibility because it 
is necessary if we are to have a workable society. Free 
will is simply a choice between alternatives, but we are 
not free to decide what those alternatives are* Translated 
into educational practices, this means certainty and predic­
tability are valued. The imaginative world is admitted only 
to the extent that it can prove itself physically, that is, 
be accountable, nameable, subject to replication. The ac­
counting and naming are necessary. We name an object clock 
for the very purpose that that object will no longer take 
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on properties other than that of a mechanical timepiece in­
tended to calibrate hours and minutes. And yet, cause-and-
effect is not sufficient because it does not admit things 
out of context* It cannot assimilate Salvador Dali and his 
limp clocks or A. £. Housman and his clock that can "Sprin­
kle the quarters on the morning town."*- Because it is in­
sufficient, it is not the whole story. Because it does not 
allow for ambiguity, for questioning, because it is unbend­
ing, ultimately it overwhelms and we, like the Underground 
Man, no longer ask why We worry whether the oil 
stove should take precedence over the firewood, never 
thinking that perhaps a match should be lit first. 
What is the difference between red and a picture of red? 
To engage in dreamwork is to enter the world of ambi­
guity and thus of possibility. Within the dream world, 
reality is bent to appear again in a more real form than 
before. There is a sense of heightened awareness, a vision 
that we are more than we appear to be. Kenneth Hayes Miller 
is an artist who depicts such a dream world. His figures 
appear distorted, exaggerated, super-real. In "Woman With 
Packages," he presents the physical body of a woman juxta­
posed against a mannequin's head. The mannequin's head is 
the precise head of the "real" woman. At the same time, 
the "real" woman is seen wearing a fur coat whose tactile 
l"Eight O'clock," in The Collected Poems of A. E» 
Housman (New York* Henry Holt & Co., 1940), line 2, p. 115. 
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sensation is more vibrantly alive than the neck into which 
it settles. Is it accidental that life exists in equally 
opposing forms, or is that the way life is? Talcing a simi­
lar line of reasoning, Edward Hopper takes time and juxta­
poses the past and present onto "House By the Railroad" so 
that they exist simultaneously. A Victorian house, caught 
in a striking angle of light, is both empty and sensuous. 
Slashing the clear space around it is a simple railroad 
track, equally empty. The feeling is that time both stopped 
and moved forward. There is an incompleteness, as if we 
are waiting for one time span to dominate. 
The dream world, because it is incomplete, because it 
imagines, invites our imagination. It forces the viewer to 
make meaning for himself. Presenting moments before or 
moments after, none dominates and it is we ourselves who 
are asked to insert order onto it. Because of the ambigu­
ity we are allowed to work ourselves into the design. The 
dream world, like the quantum theory, asserts that there is 
an uncertainty in nature beyond which we cannot empirically 
go. Translated into educational theory, the world becomes 
softly imaginative. It distorts while, at the same time, 
leaves space in which we are invited to correct the distor­
tion. Imagining, like science, does not prove. It rejects 
the null hypothesis and transposes us into the realm of pos­
sibilities. The dream is but a possibility, not a finality. 
The feeling is that we are invited to have a better dream. 
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If you turn a witch invisiblet is her ring invisible too? 
To engage in dreamwork is also to enter into the world 
of the metaphysical and thus to speculate upon man's spirit 
and his responsibility as a moral being. Nathaniel Haw­
thorne was a writer concerned with the metaphysical world. 
His Scarlet Letter1 was a testimony to the Puritan ethic 
that, since we can't kill the devil, we kill the carrier of 
the evil, the concrete manifestation of that devil. Hester 
Prynn, branded with a scarlet A, is made an object of ridi­
cule, an exact incarnation of evil. Because the townspeople 
have identified evil as something other than themselves, they 
have banished it to the world of the theatre, the illusion 
of the stage. Rather than dealing with evil in the meaning 
of their everyday lives, they have relegated it to another 
level of existence. Because Hester has been branded, the 
townspeople are able to go smugly on their way, building 
their world on love, charity, and moral exactness. Never 
mind that evil lives on in that very same selective love and 
charity. 
Yet the question remains, has evil really been ban­
ished? Is Hester's scarlet letter a symbol of victory or a 
mark of evil? Is her refusal to repent a sign of her guilt 
or does the refusal disperse the blame and make it not yet 
identifiable? Because Hawthorne does not answer, the reader 
introduction by William Lyon Phelps (New Yorki The 
Modern Library, 1927). 
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is compelled to. It is as if somehow identification, blame, 
responsibility must first be filtered through the indivi­
dual's life and dealt with in that context. To imagine is 
both to speculate and reflect upon that speculation. Be­
cause imagination gives us another, not yet categorized, 
image of the human spirit, it compels us to reflect upon our 
own image of that spirit. 
Why then is dreamwork, except where it is identifiable 
as dreamwork, not a part of school? Is it because dream-
work always has the potential to disintegrate into personal-
ism, obscurity, irrationality? Or, is it because when we 
move into the dream world we lose control? With dreamwork, 
the communal language is lost and perhaps it is too diffi­
cult and time consuming to learn a new language. It is far 
easier to design questions whose answers are predetermined 
than questions for which there is no resolution, only choi­
ces to be made. And yet, if we don't bring dreamwork back, 
if we don't make it a part of our everyday life, then evil 
will continue to thrive because it won't be recognized. 
The legalistic world of right and wrong differs from the 
world of dual vision where right and wrong are part of 
nature and only the individual can recognize and come to 
terms with that. Perhaps our task is not to judge children 
on the basis of their answers but on the basis of the ques­
tions they ask, the way they go about finding out what they 
don't know. It is in keeping the questions alive, in 
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imagining, that we keep alive a future generation, the 
stream of human consciousness that will ask the questions. 
Without the questions, the imagination, the dreamwork, 
there is no dialogue, no i/Thou. 
Can you turn a witch invisible? Do clouds hide in a 
hole in the sky? Is there a pot of gold at the end of the 
rainbow? One-story, two-story, and three-story men with 
skylights* "The framework reveals its assumptions and 
values. 
If engaging the imagination then is what we are about, 
the question remains, how can that be done? Because we 
live in both time and place, what we see and how we inter­
pret what we see are functions of that time and place. As 
Prye points out, to name something as beautiful or true is 
to a great extent to name what we have been taught is beau­
tiful and true.2 Because we are enmeshed in textures of 
habit, it is difficult to see things anew and from a dif­
ferent perspective unless we can somehow momentarily sus­
pend the time and place in which we live. One way to do 
this is to reframe the events and happenings of our lives. 
Although we cannot change our size, we can change the 
size of our viewing and, therefore, the context of that 
Êlliot W. Eisner, The Educational Imagination (New 
Yorkt Macmillan Publishing Co., 1979), p. 139. 
2Northrup Prye, The Educated Imagination (Bloomingtom 
Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 86. 
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viewing. We can look with Georgia O'Keefe at the inner 
essence of the iris, the black hole from which life seems 
to emanate. Or, we can look with William DeKooning at the 
scaffolding, the background against which our lives are 
zoned and out of which they constantly try to break. Large 
or small, the context differs and, because learning is con­
textual, we seek to find a home for these facts out of con­
text. Because we have reframed ordinary objects, an iris, 
a female figure, we have given them, with the frame, a new 
enclosure, void of previous associations, presented as a 
unit whose completeness can be found within itself. The 
frame is but a cross section, the part indicative of the 
whole, that adds richness to the whole. By framing, 
bracketing things off, we put ourselves out of time and out 
of size. We not only change our orientation, but also in­
tensify our looking. 
One such frame is the kaleidoscope. 
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CHAPTER VII 
KALEIDOSCOPESi 
THE FRAMEWORK 
He drew a circle that shut me out— 
Heretic, rebel, a thing to flout. 
But Love and I had the wit to wim 
We drew a circle and took him in! 
Edwin Markham, "Outwitted"̂  
"Every chronicle has its appropriate tone."2 We who 
are chroniclers, the keepers of memories, do so in diverse 
ways. Some records are cumulative. Much like diagramming 
a sentence, the highlights, the heart of the matter is re­
vealed and displayed on bold, black lines whose position 
points ever forward. The patterns or kaleidoscopes used by 
these chroniclers are pragmatic. Hard-edged transparencies 
are overlapped, one upon another, so that no matter which 
way the kaleidoscope is turned, a limited number of combina­
tions will appear. The cause-and-effect of the pragmatic 
kaleidoscope insists upon a prototype, an original form 
which imparts to the design a plan and order. It is possi­
ble to break down and reassemble the kaleidoscope, but the 
*In The Best Loved Poems of the American People, comp. 
Hazel Felleman (Garden City, New York* Garden City Books, 
Doubleday and Co., 1936), p. 67. 
2Doris Lessing, Canopus in Argosi Archives. The 
Marriage Between Zonei Three, Four, and Five (New Yorkt Al-
fred A. Knopf, 1980), p.3« 
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breaking down and reassembling do not reconceive the de­
sign. History that is cumulative is not necessarily reflec­
tive. 
Other records are labyrinths or mazes. The crystals 
are loose and fall randomly as the circle is turned. We 
travel through many false stops and starts, journeying to 
the center and then somehow finding the thread of thought 
that leads out again. History as maze is exciting, it al­
lows for many divergences. But, lacking consistency, it is 
also difficult to pick up the thread of original thought. 
Perhaps somewhere between the two, belonging halfway 
to a structural mode, halfway to a chaotic mode, are the 
kaleidoscopes I use. Their focus is never quite stable. 
The image, incisive for a moment, is continually shifting 
off, forming new patterns. The image is but an approxima­
tion of the truth that holds for only that moment. The ele­
ments are like watercolors, emerging, overlapping, opaque. 
The insistence here is not that we choose one kaleido­
scope over another, but that we allow the kaleidoscope to 
reveal the story's configuration, the mode of thought in 
which we are living, and that we then use that seeing to 
change our focus, to reframe continually the events and 
happenings of our lives. 
I have chosen to call these patterns we weave and re-
weave kaleidoscopes. Other names would suffice« models, 
paradigms, taxonomy, and yet, there is something in the 
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kaleidoscope, a sense of play perhaps, for it is after 
all a child's toy, a nonsense system of order. 
Having its origin in children's play, the kaleidoscope 
marks off or frames the area into which we look much as a 
playground marks off or frames an area. It therefore be­
comes "a temporary world within the ordinary one, dedicated 
to the performance of an act apart."1 This marking off 
gives things structure, but, at the same time, allows us to 
play, to explore within that structure, to "leap without 
escaping gravity.''̂  Thus, the world, while being what it 
is, is at the same time open to many alternatives, even 
contradictory ones. Because we look through a kaleidoscope, 
we cannot only count things and add them up; we can also 
count and add up what isn't there. 
To look at our lives as kaleidoscopes is to partici­
pate in this play, this enchantment. It is to affirm the 
imagination, to entertain different perspectives. Because 
the elements of a kaleidoscope fall randomly, their combi­
nations are unlimited. The imagination is set free to ask 
if blue overlaps yellow or yellow overlaps blue, if "houses 
are haunted / By white nightgowns. / None are green, / 
%uizinga, quoted in Erik H. Erikson, Toys and Reasoni 
Stages in the Ritualization of Experience (New Yorki W.W. 
Norton and Company, 1977), P« 
2lbid., p. 17. 
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Or purple with green rings, / Or green with yellow rings. 
At the same time the imagination is set free, it is held in 
check by the logic of the internal mechanism which dictates 
a structure to this randomness. Patterns are made to re­
peat, to mirror, to echo, both within the frame and from 
frame to frame. Within this nonsense system of order, both 
the logical and imaginative strands are interwoven. To look 
at our lives as kaleidoscope is to hold in our mind two con­
tradictory arguments at the same time and to be able to 
trace each out to its ultimate end to see where they inter­
sect. 
The mirrors which line the tube reflect the image 
of the gems 
And by their reflection 
your view is made smaller 
and larger 
You see a smaller portion of the reality 
which exists at the end of the tube 
But you see it again and again and again and 
again and again 
The kaleidoscope allows you to reflect on reality 
many many times 
all at once.2 
A kaleidoscope functions by virtue of the fact that it 
is continually turning, continually refraining the events 
within the larger frame. To keep the kaleidoscope turning 
Ŵallace Stevens, "Disillusionment of Ten O'clock," in 
The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens (New York» Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1973)» lines 1-5, p. 66. 
R̂ichard Chesher, "Moirascope," a handbook of concepts 
about the Moirascope, distributed by Neiman-Marcus, Dallas, 
Texas, 1978, p. 11. 
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is to continually rearrange the premises on which we operate, 
the grounds on which we perceive as well as the reflections 
we send back to others. To turn the kaleidoscope is not to 
exchange the content of one consciousness for the content of 
another consciousness, but to change the mode of being con­
scious. 1 As the circle turns, the elements are different 
yet similar, routine yet unexpected. The crystals fall, in 
one place now, in another place next, both complementing 
and contradicting each other's presence so that "every feel­
ing, every thought holds in it its opposition."2 
They are always different 
But they are not random 
for they will fall where the sum of 
their past 
and your influence 
and gravity 
their shape 
and your haste 
puts them 
Their final destination is in your hands 
but beyond your control3 
The individual elements are the strands of importance. 
Without them there would be no pattern. It is in this 
sense that each individual is unique and nonreplicable. He 
comes with his own characteristics, quality, background, 
capacities, and these are nonmanipulative factors. At the 
•̂ •Robert E. Ornstein, The Psychology of Consciousness, 
2nd ed. (New York* Hareourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), p« 
126. 
2I»essing, Canopus in Argos. p. 114. 
3chesher, "Moirascope," p. 12. 
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same time, he is part of the overall pattern, for the image 
he makes is reflected back in a similar yet different form. 
Only when the two are taken as one, complementing and con­
tradicting each other, is there pattern. We are reflec­
tions who mirror each other's lives and, at the same time 
add variations to that mirror. Without beginning or end, 
there is but a center point from which all things have 
their being and are connected. 
for each bit of glass and crystal has a history 
that spans four billion years 
and all humans 
and all animals 
all life and 
all elements 
are visible in there 
What you see 
is a hologram 
of realitŷ  
Common to all kaleidoscopes is the boundary, the cir­
cle that defines the boundaries of our thoughts. It is the 
container out of which we continually operate. No matter 
how it is set up, we don*t test our thoughts against our ac­
tions, we live our thoughts in our actions. The circle is 
complete within itself. The energy within is the same as 
that which Buckminster Fuller described when he said, "Ener­
gy never goes away, it just reappears somewhere else in a 
different form."2 Like the clouds that vanish in the blue 
llbid., p. 13. 
2Synergetics (New Yorki Macmillan Publishing Company, 
1975), p. 10. 
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as the sun's heat dissipates them, so our lives are constant­
ly rearranging, reforming. And yet, the circle is not ex­
haustive. "The universe is finite, the combinations are 
not."* Like a drop of water on a flagstone which admits 
another drop and another, ever expanding, ever accommodating, 
what we see today will tomorrow become a piece of something 
else* 
Each of us is all the sums he has not counted . . . 
Each moment is the fruit of forty thousand years. 
The minute-winning days, like flies, buzz home 
to death, and every moment is a window on all 
time.2 
The circle is but a piece of the eternal circle of which we 
are one. 
There are as many kaleidoscopes as there are textures 
and patterns in our lives. The world is not either/or. It 
is either and or. Those kaleidoscopes presented here simply 
told my story. Other stories would require other configura­
tions. The point is not to choose one kaleidoscope over 
another, but to banish the inertia that even kaleidoscopes 
bring, the knowledge that once a pattern is established, it 
repeats itself. To continually change the lens, both within 
our kaleidoscopes and from kaleidoscope to kaleidoscope is 
what we are about in looking at schools. It is in changing 
the lens that we raise questions, not answers, that we 
llbid. 
T̂homas Wolfe, Look Homeward, Angel (New York* Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 3. 
13^ 
establish dialogue. A liberal education is that which 
liberates us from any one mode of thought. 
The threads that were spun have now been gathered in, 
circles within circles, stories without end. 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
T.S. Eliot, "Little Gidding"1 
*In "Four Quartets," in Collected Poems» 1909-1962 
(New Yorki Harcourt, Brace & World, 193*0, lines 242-244, 
p. 208. 
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THE STAGING 
136 
137 
CHAPTER VIII 
FORD ISLAND 
RE-ENVISIONING TIME, PLACE, AND LANGUAGE 
Military installations are a world unto themselves. 
Supported by an elaborate system of rules, ranks, and privi­
leges, people are at best nonpersons. They exist by virtue 
of their function, because it is the system which must en­
dure . To ensure the continuation of nonpersons and the 
endurance of that system, the Army has devised a special 
language through which it communicates. Consisting of 
abbreviations (reduction of things to their simplest compo­
nent) in conjunction with elaborate sentence constructions 
(In ref to para 2 and pursuant to Article 6, Sec 5 • • •)» 
it seems to make things perfectly clear without making them 
understandable. This confused state of affairs so per­
meates one*s existence that ultimately one is unable to get 
it out of his head. He merely functions on command. 
Ford Island is one such installation. 
A tiny dot in the middle of Pearl Harbor, Ford Island 
is a satellite of Pearl Harbor Naval Base, Naval Headquar­
ters of the Pacific. Its function is classified! something 
to do with topography and blueprints was all I was ever 
told. The island's only road serves as an airstrip for 
small planes. Quonset huts clustered near the south end of 
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the island serve as barracks, headquarters, and storage 
sheds. The largest of these is occupied by a recovered 
space satellite. On the north end of the island, visible 
through the grove of ironwood and palm trees, are eight 
white colonial houses, officers* quarters. Here lawns are 
manicured, children play, and wives sit on the verandahs 
that stretch the length of the house, drinking tea and won­
dering if the ferry is on schedule or when their husbands 
will be reassigned. Meanwhile, not more than one hundred 
yards from their front lawns lies the water of Pearl Harbor 
and the sunken remains of the USS California. No less than 
seven ships and crew lie submerged within three hundred 
yards of the island's perimeter. 
On this island within an island, time slides quietly 
by. Undisturbed and undisturbing, it glances off the USS 
California and the space satellite equally. Somewhere 
there is an underlying theme, as if past and future were 
here collected in the present, if we but had eyes to see. 
I rode the ferry to Ford Island each day for a year, 
fighting rush-hour traffic pouring into Pearl Harbor Naval 
Base, queueing behind the red stickers (civilian person­
nel) where we were then pushed and shoved, garbage truck 
and telephone repairman alike, onto the flat bed of the -• 
ferry for the fifteen-minute ride past the memorial to the 
USS Arizona, a T-shaped slab of granite, striding the Bpot 
where so many men lost their lives that day in December, 
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19̂ 1» to the MP station that marked the entrance to Ford 
Island. Unloading, officers first, it was but then a short 
ride across the airstrip to Building l65*f and fifteen Navy 
clerks awaiting a class in Effective Military Writing. 
In essence, Effective Military Writing was a course de­
signed to rid military correspondence of redundancy, dang­
ling modifiers, and misplaced sentence structure. The 
course was presented in the form of movies, a written book­
let, and a test booklet. Instructors of such courses were 
traditionally military personnel. At that time, however, 
the Vietnam War was winding down and the military was moving 
into a position of cutting down, closing bases, and consoli­
dating personnel. Thus, courses such as this were handed 
over to civilian personnel who worked on a contractual 
basis. Because education was not an integral branch of the 
Armed Services, it could be more easily cut later on. 
Post exchanges, commissaries, and clubs are all run on such 
a contractual basis by civilians because they too are ancil­
lary to the military's function. 
Stripping military correspondence of such obsolete 
phrases as with regards to. in the matter concerning. Effec­
tive Military Writing attempted to define a supposedly more 
readable and understandable system of language. What it did 
was simply substitute one confusing system for another. 
And, TAMC remained TAMC, short for Tripler Army Medical 
Center, even shorter for that eight-story pink mass of 
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stucco whose apex sits halfway up the Koolau Mountain Range, 
commanding vast views of the Pacific, Pearl Harbor and, off 
to the left, Waikiki and Diamond Head. Its red-tiled, 
summer porches, extending from each patient's room, are as 
serene as the ceiling fans which slowly turn overhead. TAMO, 
however, is not even an address. It is simply a duty assign­
ment. 
Hawaii and Ford Island are now just a time tucked away 
in my mind. Lying behind the first lobe, they nevertheless 
constantly slip out into my consciousness, clanking to the 
surface, demanding attention. Ford Island with its technology 
and secretiveness, its attempt to be perfectly clear yet 
not understandable, seems to be the direction in which our 
schools are headed. And yet, underlying that direction is 
a richness not yet discovered, ribbons of existence which 
overlap each other, ways of thinking and being which lie 
there, if we only had eyes to see. 
The following then is an attempt, not to exorcise the 
ghost, but to make sense out of this elusiveness that never­
theless persists. Just as the time and space of Ford Island 
informed its language and thought and in turn its practices, 
so too do the time and space in which we live inform that 
living. Somehow, the content of our learning is inseparably 
related to the context of that learning. To reassess prac­
tice, the visible product, it is thus necessary to work our way 
in and through time and space and to delve into the 
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language through which that time and space speak. It is to 
turn the kaleidoscope. 
142 
1^3 
CHAPTER IX 
THE SHAPE OP TIME 
A novelist constructs the world his people inhabit. 
Characterizations, setting, motivations, interrelation­
ships, each are pieces of the elaborate mosaic he weaves. 
Constantly moving in and out of the minds of his characters, 
around and through their world, he sets up encounters by 
shaping the time and space appropriate to those encounters. 
He may begin his novel in the middle and work forward, at 
the end and work backward, or even at a point between time, 
as in Waiting for Godotj- where time itself, sent into limbo, 
is unable to make an appearance. Tying time into knots and 
figure eights, the novelist bends that thin line on which 
we calibrate seconds, minutes, and hours, to provide a 
suitable form for his content. "What was the worst thing 
you've ever done? I won't tell you that, but 1*11 tell you 
the worst thing that ever happened to me. . . . "2 begins 
Ghost Story, an after-the-fact statement which, instead of 
giving a summation, draws us into the events that led up to 
that fact. Like fireworks, each of whose end points bursts 
into yet another firework, are Straub's stories. Each story, 
Ŝamuel Beckett, Waiting for Godot. 
P̂eter Straub, Ghost Story (New Yorki Coward, McCann 
and Geoghegan, 1979)» p. 13« 
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in turn, acts as both an end point to one mystery and an 
unfolding of yet another. Time spelled backwards, inside 
out, retelling stories already told, each is the novelistte 
way of displacing that time and space, of rearranging the 
conditions and circumstances under which we live, so that 
those lives may have meaning and resolution. And the world 
is held still, if but for a moment. 
Perhaps this holding still of the world is what we are 
about as humans. Given breath and life within the dimen­
sions of time and space rather than on the pages of a novel, 
we travel on a continuum from birth to death, never yet 
knowing where one experience ends and another begins. Being 
immersed in clusters of occurrences, or spread out in that 
limbo that never seems to end, we are not allowed resolu­
tions, only responses, continuing dialogues. Yet, it is in 
those very responses that we, like the novelist, are able 
to work our way forward as well as backward, are able to 
create a space for ourselves in this universe in which we 
live. Because response calls for perceiving as well as re­
ceiving, breaking with the past as well as reconstructing 
that past, it is a process that calls for the moment-to-
moment construction of our own scripts. Unable to stop 
time, we hold it still by standing in relationship to it. 
By engaging in life, we are able to impart meaning to that 
life. To write our own scripts then, we, like the novelist, 
must recast time if we are to provide a suitable form for 
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the content of our days. 
The following is an attempt to recast time. It grew 
out of William Barrett's work on technology versus human 
freedom in The Illusion of Technique. Herein time, like 
Barrett's technology, is seen not as a thing in itself tout 
as a human construct. Bscause it is not something we have 
to live with but something we've chosen to live with, then 
it is examined in terms of what it has to say about that 
human being. 
Silhouettes 
/And so they dance across the stagê  play 
cricket, cook cakes, make simple decisions, re­
member their childhood, and go to the circus 
/and not one of them is known toJ7 commit sins, 
fall in love, say prayers, or join the Commu­
nist Party.1 
The time with which we are most familiar is linear 
time. It is the time under which we live, a grid placed 
over our lives, predetermined and nonnegotiable. Such 
time is the time of nouns, discrete, separate minutes which 
tick off our existence. Present time is simply that which 
keeps dissolving into the past.̂  Future time is unknown, 
events which simply lurk around the corner, waiting for us. 
Past time is that which is already gone. In the time of 
nouns, there is nothing to hold on to; man is but a creature 
ilris Murdoch, quoted in Barrett, The Illusion of Tech-
nique. p. 70. 
2Frye, The Educated Imagination, p. 79. 
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of fate. 
Linear time, because it is fragmented, artificially 
divides the days of our lives, separating us from the es­
sence of those lives. It asserts that what is being taught 
takes precedence over who. We study subject matter year 
after year but change teachers every hour. The taxonomy of 
letters, capitals, dates, are all taught in the abstract, 
in language once removed from experience, as if language 
and experience were two separate things. Thus, the lan­
guage itself becomes phonetic, broken down into discrete 
sounds rather than dealt with in units of meaning. 
Because our world is divided into discrete separate 
minutes, so too are the words we use to describe that world. 
With no hope of past gliding into future or future dissolv­
ing into past, our vocabulary for talking about these dis­
crete separate minutes can be no less exacting, its meaning 
no less specific. Thus, in the name of directness, economy, 
and exactness, we obliterate from words their history of 
associations, the childhood memories with which they are 
connected, their negotiable quality.̂  Taking away these 
histories, these ambiguities, words are no longer meant to 
have association with our lives, but are meant as something 
apart from those lives. The result is that our lives have 
a sameness to them, a routine. Every yellow becomes the 
2-Edman, Arts and the Man, p. 61. 
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same yellow. Every child becomes the same child, differing 
in degree, not in composition. 
Perhaps these abstract formal definitions are an at­
tempt to put things in order, to have a beginning and an 
end, and to provide us with general principles that will 
apply in future situations. Yet, general principles are 
somehow robbed of their depth and richness. That all ob­
jects which are fleshy, round, red or yellow edible fruit 
are called apples somehow fails to include the worm cling­
ing tenaciously to the surface, the soft spot which indents 
the side of the grained pattern of red, green, and yellow, 
and the firmness of that first bite and the resulting juice 
that dribbles down the chin. It fails to take into account 
the experience of the apple itself. And, we rebel, not so 
much because the apple has been named before we know it, 
but because the naming is a substitute for knowing it. 
Linear time, because it removes language from experience, 
divorces man from his life, the actor from his setting. 
To divorce knowledge from person assumes that there is 
a body of material out there waiting to be found. Like 
Easter eggs lying among the grass, such knowledge merely 
awaits our discovery. Such a construct does not take into 
account the human being who must make judgments as to the 
value, usefulness, and meaning of that knowledge. Similarly, 
learning divorced from context becomes an additive process. 
Collect a few nouns, scoop up some verbs, string them 
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together with connectors and we have vocabulary, grammati­
cal structure, and communication. Such a construct, how­
ever, fails to take into account the organic nature of these 
words, their chameleon-like ability to change color and 
function to suit the situation. Nouns, verbs, and connec­
tors function within the context of time, place, and speaker. 
Void of that context, they are nonsense. "'Twas brillig, 
and the slithy toves / Did gyre and gimble in the wabe."1 
In the time of nouns, therefore, truth lies in obser­
vation and quantification, in the historical dates we can 
cite and the number of mathematical functions we can do. 
We give children skills to read the dictionary. We tell 
them where the encyclopedias are. We give them a form for 
making an outline. We set up a thousand exercises using 
decoding skills. Somehow though, we leave to chance the 
imagination that must integrate that reading, that knowledge. 
It is magic to read words and make meaning out of those 
words. It is magic to see geography, people, places, and 
governments dancing in a line and draw connections between 
those topics that are pleasing and unifying. It is magic 
to understand that two appearing three times is six divided 
two times. To ignore the person and the context is to as­
sume the child is a stick figure, to be extended, by the addi­
tion of curve here, identifying mark there. And so, we add 
L̂ewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland. t>. 
!29. 
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to him a new set of clothes each year until, ultimately, 
his appearance is manageable, appropriate. He is as isola­
ted as the context in which we have placed him. 
Because linear time asks us to disassociate, to give 
up our search for meaning, it robs the spirit of its poten­
tiality so that we, like the amoeba, are pushed and shoved, 
asked to fit into a mold, to smooth a wrinkle in our skin, 
to make convex that which is concave, to conform. The self 
constantly held up for comparison against other selves, as 
something apart, ultimately comes to believe that that self 
is separate. He believes he is someone who maintains sys­
tems and quantifies by results. These persons, separated 
from other persons, retreat into a privatism until "we 
stare vacantly at those who stare vacantly back at us, un-
noticingi none of us is there, each lost in his own absence 
Social intercourse is but a mere illusion. Linked external­
ly by virtue of the time and space we happen to share, we 
play cricket and cook cakes, but we do not cry and fall in 
love. 
The end result of linear time is that the style be­
comes the story, the form becomes the content. With no pro­
visions for recasting it, one simply travels physically, 
never having known he was there. He has style but no story, 
Separated from its informing vision, linear time is a 
-̂Barrett, The Illusion of Technique, p. 213. 
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carburator laid out in pieces, pistons and valves moving 
endlessly up and down, while the motorcycle leans chained 
to a tree. It is a detached heart, pumping blood, to 
where? It is technology reduced to technique. 
Silhouettes) the human form drained of all color, all 
subjective sense, is left with but an outline, a silhouette.* 
This attempt to capture all of life into one overall 
system was the task the philosopher Wittgenstein set for 
himself in his Principia Mathematica. Working from a posi­
tion of logic, Wittgenstein ultimately concluded that Mthe 
facts that constitute the world are utterly disconnected 
and lie external to each other within logical space."2 In 
other words, A may be true or not true and B may be true or 
not true, but the truth or falsity of either one has nothing 
to do with the other. All we can prove in this world of 
appearances is the truth or untruth of something. There­
fore, the world is governed by mathematical logic. It may 
be proven true or not true, but connections cannot be made. 
Thus, the proper language with which to talk about these 
things is abstract language. Disassociated from subject, 
abstract language is a thing in itself, an objective lan­
guage such as mathematical logic. Principia Mathematica 
simply reinforced the belief that ultimate reality is out­
side us, a grid to be placed over our lives, a universal noun. 
llbid., p. 47. 2ibid., p. 33. 
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Language, or symbol systems, however, are not a thing 
in themselves. They are devices created by man. Mathemati­
cal logic comes from ordinary experiences of the everyday. 
It is a human construct. Thus, its premises are always 
open, subject to reinterpretation. The world is not out 
there waiting to be discoveredi it is rather something that 
we create and improvise as we go along. Therefore, it must 
be talked about in ordinary terms, in ordinary language. It 
was this leap from open to closed language that Wittgenstein 
took in his Tractatus and with it brought a whole new set of 
questions. Rather than how do I do this, the question now 
is why is there this at all. To move from describing the 
world scientifically, to recording its every tick, to asking 
that the world is, that it is something rather than nothing, 
that was the mystery.1 Wittgenstein, by taking this leap, 
gave evidence of the existence of the human spirit. Turning 
his back on all the skills he had so laboriously acquired, 
he plunged into the unknown simply because his will refused 
to be named without participating in that naming. 
The noun of linear time then, like the technique into 
which it dissolves, is but an illusion. Existence is not 
dependent upon universal laws which will ultimately be de­
coded. Existence is dependent upon man. It is man who con­
structs the way he names his world and, therefore, the way 
llbid., p. 151. 
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that world operates. Linear time is but one of the con­
structs. Because the physical world of our senses, the sea­
sons, birth to life to death, action to reaction, all collab­
orate its existence, linear time is a simple and useful way 
to handle living. Because there was a yesterday, there 
will be a today and a tomorrow is another way of saying 
that if we do this, then we can predict with certainty that 
that will occur. Perhaps if we existed only physically, 
linear time would be enough. Death, existence, and even 
chance would be acceptable because they would be part of the 
natural, e.g., physical process. But we are more than phy­
sical. We are also spirit, will, consciousness, and in that 
spirit we intuit another existence, not yet verbalized, but 
nevertheless real. It is given evidence when we see our 
daughter enter first grade and wonder where the other five 
years went. Or, it is seen in the slow motion photography 
that seems to filter over us as the car, having run off the 
road, balances on two wheels, as if deciding whether to 
turn over or right itself. It is as if time and change no 
longer run simultaneously but are contra-indicative of each 
other. And so the spirit, rejecting the time of nouns, 
reaches out to the time of verbs, to living in relationship 
to time and to having time and space stand in relationship 
to that spirit. 
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Sketches 
The young man or woman writing today has for­
gotten the problems of the human heart in 
conflict with itself which alone can make good 
writing because only that is worth writing 
about, worth the agony and the sweat. . . . 
Until he does so, he labors under a curse. He 
writes not of love but of lust, of defeats in 
which nobody loses anything of value, of vic­
tories without hope and, worst of all, without 
pity or compassion. His griefs grieve on no 
universal bones, leaving no scars. He writes 
not of the heart but of the glands.1 
A character begins life in the mind of his author. 
Guaranteed nothing except possibility, he is equipped with 
bag and baggage, gesture and tone. Subconsciously moving 
through different stances, he stands juxtaposed against 
others, being tested for strengths and weaknesses, the ex­
pected and the unexpected. Given a context in which to 
work, his role is expanded to include motivation and conse­
quence until, ultimately, unable to function in relationship 
to others, he fails and goes back to the subconscious, or, 
capable of forming relationships, and sustaining on-going con­
versations, he succeeds in becoming valid and walks onto the 
stage, a force to be reckoned with and dealt with. Begin­
ning as possibility, a mere reflection in someone*s mind, 
the character, if he is to live, must ultimately act out 
his own script, demand his own writing. Character becomes 
author. 
lwilliam Faulkner, "Nobel Prize Address," in The 
Faulkner Reader (New Yorki Random House, 1929I The Modern 
Library, 1959), pp. 3-̂ . 
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We, like those characters, exist as possibility* Given 
life and breath in an historical, cultural framework, we 
exist within that framework. Bag and baggage are deter­
mined, as are the people and places of the world to which 
we are juxtaposed. And yet, that very framework is the con­
text out of which we will perform. It is the definition 
from which we write as well as the definition to which we 
write. Because we reach out, touch its sides, in an effort 
to apprehend our position in the universe, we make some­
thing out of that position. Because we test our lives, 
picking up a thread here, dropping a stitch there, we give 
to those lives depth and breadth. Because we create our own 
ways of being in the world, reconceiving that world while, 
at the same time, being grounded in it, we are the script 
writers. Because we are script writers, the focal point 
through which and by which life has meaning, time and space 
stand in relationship to our scripts. They complement our 
lives. 
While Wittgenstein had made the subjective viable, had 
shown that an abstraction such as linear time was not a 
thing in itself, separate from existence, but was one way we 
had named existence, he failed to address the dichotomy that 
we live both within time and in relation. to time. Life 
is both a succession of days (composed of minutes and sec­
onds that externally tick off) and the meaning of those days 
(that succession has meaning internally, in and through the 
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individual). On the one hand, we can't say the world out 
there (external, linear time) doesn't exist. If we do so 
then we cancel our history and the history of the place with 
which ours is so entwined. At the same time, we can't say 
man has no effect on time because he does in fact "stain" 
the place in which he lives "with the marks of his own exis­
tence."1 Life is both good and evil Time is both subject 
and object. 
It was left to Heidegger to hold the diagonal in place 
with his concept of Being. According to Heidegger, Being 
is the grounding, the source from which all things come. 
Man, the world, reality, appearance, subject, object, are 
all part of or manifestations of this Being. Because all 
things have their ground in this Being, they may be separa­
ted. We can distinguish between a book and ourselves be-
i 
cause the world (Being) contains both ourselves and a book.2 
However, these things cannot be disconnected. A book does 
not exist independent of a consciousness to apprehend that 
book, nor does a consciousness exist independent of the ob­
jects to which it intends. Man does not exist independently 
of the world. Man is in the world and the world is in man. 
As Ernst Cassirer explains it, appearance is not something 
other than reality. Appearance is the manifestation of the 
reality and reality is the source for appearance. We are 
iBarrett, Illusion of Technique, p. 129. . 
2Ibid., p. 130. 
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forever bound, subject to object, man to world, one to an­
other. It is not that the objective world is transformed 
into a subjective one. It is that they are one and the 
same.̂  
It is in this sense that time, as a part of Being, is 
something which moves on and something through which all 
existence moves. Separate from man, it is inevitably bound 
up with him. The hours tick by, but we experience that 
ticking in various ways. To the pianist, there is never 
enough time. To the child, inside on a rainy day, there is 
too much time* There is the time of youth when memories 
are short and the time of old age when memories are long and 
the doing grows shorter with each day. In the time of 
verbs, past, present, and future weave different patterns, 
congruent with the weaver. Like watercolors, each of which 
retains its own integrity, time frames constantly overlap, 
some blending, some receding, none ever disappearing, sim­
ply not yet called into use. 
The time of verbs is our way of being in this world. 
The metaphor on which they all turn is the metaphor of pres­
ence, or the present. To be present is to be subject and 
to see the world as object, each complementing the other. 
Icassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, pp. 67-74. 
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The Conveyor Belt - Sketch #1 
There was a child went forth every day 
And the first object he looked upon 
and received with wonder or pity or love or dread, 
that object he became. 
And that object became part of him for the day, 
or a certain part of the day.... 
or for many years or stretching cycles of years. 
Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grassl 
We can neither halt our journey through time nor re­
verse our passage because past, present, and future are a 
continuum, a horizontal line along which we move. Like the 
conveyor belt at the airport, we exist somewhere along that 
line, always journeying away from where we were towards 
where we will be. And so, the conveyor belt moves on and 
we with it, a vertical cross bar punctuating the horizontal 
line. It is within this vertical that all else is judged. 
Because we do not ride parallel to life, but exist within 
life, embedded in a texture of history, it is the vertical, 
the human existence, that both gives meaning to our days 
and separates us from the sameness of those days. 
Having entered into a sequence of history, our biology 
coincides with ongoing events in history and those events 
determine our activities.2 They are also our resources for 
living, our occasions for acting on the world. As Andr€ 
•̂Ed. Malcolm Cowley (New Yorki Viking Press, 1959), 
p. 138. 
Ĝeorge Kubler, The Shape of Time (New Haven* Yale 
University Press, 1962;, p. 6. 
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Malraux has explained, because we exist within history, we 
are able to recall our past and give it new definition as 
well as to project infinite possibilities onto the future. 
The past is not something that fades into oblivion, but is 
something that is constantly recalled to function in the 
present.̂  The future is not something that lurks around 
the corner, but is a possibility, an outgrowth of our being 
now, our interaction with the given. 
Movement, therefore, within the subjective time frame 
is multi-directional. To move forward may be to circumvent 
physically the histories of peoples with the history of a 
person. Leonardo da Vinci, scientist, inventor, artist of 
flying machines and gross anatomy, living in a time when 
the world was still flat and spirits directed bodily move­
ment, "prefigures in the work of a few years the series 
that several generations will slowly and laboriously 
evolve."̂  
To move forward may also be to move backwards. "The 
birth of every new art modifies those that went before it."3 
Because the past can be seen only through the eyes of the 
present, then the present informs the past. Rodin enlarges 
our understanding of Michelangelo. Cubism enlarges our 
M̂alraux, The Voices of Silence, pp. 616-663. 
2Kubler, The Shape of Time, p. 88. 
3Malraux, The Voices of Silence, p. 68. 
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understanding of Polynesian sculpture. In this sense, the 
past is never lost; it simply re-emerges in a new form.̂  
Finally, to move forward may also be to not move at 
all. I first read Macbeth when I was sixteen. Macbeth 
then was only an historical play that happened in an histor­
ical time. It had no connectors to my life. So it sat, an 
image tucked away, much like Ford Island has been tucked 
away, in the box of my subconscious. Then, one day I was 
twenty-four and the events of my life brought it into focus 
again in a way that integrated Shakespeare's meaning with 
my meaning. There needed to be that stretch of years, in­
tervening images, before it could be read with any clarity, 
could be defined as anything other than a vague feeling of 
disquiet. 
The human antenna, if encouraged, is both sensitive 
and enduring. 
Because time is multi-directional, it is related to 
the individual in the present tense of his life. School 
then cannot be conceived of on the horizontal as if it were 
a conveyor belt on which we put a child and ask him to ride 
parallel to life, moving at the same speed as others in his 
age group, judging his performance in terms of consequences, 
the residue he leaves behind. Instead, school must be 
looked at from the vertical as it relates to the horizontal. 
llbid., p. 642. 
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Because understanding is going out to form relationships, 
those relationships cannot be dictated to by linear time. 
In the present, the subjective is able to "gather up into 
itself what has past and preserve it as present"̂  and then 
"the future is anticipated from the standpoint of the 
present."2 
Education then isn*t something we set up and leave. 
Education is new each moment we go to it. In this sense, 
it must move both forward and backwards, backwards in dis­
covering things whose possibilities haven*t been called into 
existence yet, forward in that we start with the given and 
ask for expansion, new images, and new eyes to see those 
images. 
The Time-Out Room - Sketch #2 
Man then is a choosing being, a spirit who endures be­
cause he actualizes his choices through the imagination. 
Drawing together both past and future, it is the image-
making capacity that enables us to connect and therefore to 
evaluate critically. To enter this imaginative world then, 
it is necessary to suspend time, to enter the time-out room. 
Silence is not a part of our traditional classrooms. 
Within them, silence is to be feared. It is punishment. In 
these schools we have developed a special place of silence 
Ĉassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, p. 77. 
2Ibid., p. 203. 
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called the time-out room. In some schools it is the empty 
classroom next door. In others, it is the book room, a win-
dowless storage room whose door locks on the outside. The 
time-out room is where students who misbehave are sent. 
Put away from other people, they serve penance here, appro­
priate with their deed, until time passes, the door is un­
locked, and they are admitted back into the classroom. 
The time-out room exists both as reality and as meta­
phor. The reality is the time-out room of silence. The 
metaphor is the possibility of being the time-in-between 
room. Neither distracting nor demanding, it can be the 
place where we engage in silent manipulations, where past is 
joined to present, where information is integrated and assi­
milated, where we pause between stimulus and response and 
hold the world still in order to assess it. In this place 
in between, we may stand apart from life as lived and criti­
cally assess it. Within this pause, language goes under­
ground and becomes imagination, possibilities dancing in a 
line, characterizations tested for strength and validity. 
The manipulation of images is the individuals alone. It 
can neither be hurried nor hushed up. It can only be given 
time and space in which to occur. The thing is, we can't 
ask to go there, to this time-out or time-in-between room. 
We have to be sent. 
Sketches in an unfinished landscapei action has been 
joined to character, movement incorporated into language. 
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But the questions remain, in what setting shall he perform 
and to whom shall he speak. 
163 
164 
CHAPTER X 
THE REFLECTIONS OP SPACE 
Multiple Shadows 
We then are the characters who walk out onto the stage. 
At the same time, both real and invented, we stand in rela­
tionship to and with the people and objects of the world. 
Space is the surface on which our shadows fall, the mirror 
that reflects back who we are. Like the TV picture that is 
not yet tuned, these shadows exist as prisms, multiple re­
flections of our composite self. So, we constantly try to 
pull them in, to realign them with the true self. Snatching 
an image from time, arranging a shape in space, making sense 
out of the events that surround our lives, we give both line 
and composition to those selves. We arrange the fragments 
to function as a whole and the true self becomes a compos­
ite of all his selves. Breadth has been added to the sil­
houette and depth to the sketch. 
Space is but a companion piece to time. To be in this 
room (space) is to be in this world (time). To look out the 
window and see a tree is to see it in the present, in time. 
To remember when we first planted that tree is to preserve 
the past, also in time. Time is the reference point for the 
tree and sky just as the tree and sky are the reference 
points for time. The leaves are now beginning to turn. 
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Yellow and red, they fall, never in a lump sum, burt one by 
one, until it will be February and we will rake the last 
one from the bushes and gardens. The condition of the 
leaves indicates time as surely as time indicates the condi­
tion of those leaves. 
Time and space then are ensemble players, one inevita­
bly bound to the other. To single out one for observation 
is not to separate that one from the other. It is but to 
bring that one to the foreground while realizing that the 
background is always present in the foreground. Time and 
space both thread their way through our existence, provid­
ing us with a context in which to function. Space, there­
fore, is the framework for that context. We live in a 
house, we work in an office, we were born in North Carolina. 
Shoes enclose feet, books enclose ideas, white sheets of 
typing paper enclose words. Organizations enclose institu­
tions. This physical shaping of space is an attempt to 
deal with things, to separate them from the chaos of experi­
ence. By shaping space, we are able to define and clarify 
its elements. We translate the educational ideas of aware­
ness of self, environment and fellow man into an organiza­
tion called schooling which provides people, places, and 
spaces that enhance that idea. 
So, we shape space physically (operationally) the way 
science shapes it and somehow forget there may be other 
forms of spacei positive and negative, empty and full, 
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within and without. It is as if in our rush to enclose 
words on a paper, we forget about the ones that didn't get 
enclosed. In our rush to translate institution into organi­
zation, we forget to allow for participation as well as dis­
tancing, for a place to contact each other as persons as 
well as a place to be apart from the play we're in. Some­
how, we've forgotten psychological space and the space to 
reflect, to synthesize. 
Physical space, like linear time, cannot be denied. 
We are bound to the landscape by gravity. We walk upright 
and name a front or back, up or down, right or left. But 
to be bound to it physically is not the same as worshiping 
its technique, its form. As Rudolf Arnheim has pointed out, 
shapes, colors, and sounds have become techniques for enter­
taining the senses. We have thus come to worship this form 
or technique separate from its content. Art is no longer 
read as a reflection of life's meaning but is judged on the 
basis of its surface texture, its arrangement of colors and 
shapes on the plane of the painting, its vocabulary of 
forms. Just as art criticism has come to be aimed at form, 
so too has educational criticism. We judge a student's 
writing on whether he stays within the lines, not on whether 
he has something to say outside of the lines. We look at 
school practices in terms of what theories are being used, 
what behavior is displayed, all done with a critical de­
tachment, as if we ourselves were not passionately 
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involved.1 We are so busy describing that we are no longer 
interpreting and evaluating the character and quality of 
education. 
Physical space, like linear time, quantifies. It as­
sumes that man runs alongside life rather than head on into 
it. This quantification is not limited to our public places 
such as school but also has invaded the private places. One 
such place is in ritual. Once, perhaps, we knew why we 
broke a bottle on the bow of a ship. In the breaking of 
that bottle, we dealt with many gods and many superstitions. 
Now we know only that we manipulate the object (bottle) for 
some instrumental purpose (launching a ship). Ritual has 
become drama unqualified, a form to be gone through, a mo­
tion without the emotion. 
To run head on into life, to reunite with spirits that 
we perhaps once knew, is to relocate ourselves in space. It 
is to remember that space is but a translation of our proxi­
mity to objects and peoples of this world. As such, it may 
be looked at in terms of density, spread, near, far, within, 
and without. 
iRudolf Arnheim, Toward a Psychology of Art (Berkeley* 
University of California Press, 1966), pp. 10-13. 
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Three Reflections 
Tableau - Reflection #1 
Mary Margaret has arranged her three cats, two alive, 
one stuffed, beside her on the piano bench. Po and Wink 
touch noses. Dumpy leans precariously off the edge. It is 
a pleasing arrangement of objects and spaces, still yet not 
quite still. They seem to reach across space, these cats 
and child, bringing the other near or holding her far. If 
we diagrammed the arrangement, there would be lines going 
everywhere, webs within webs, new spolces emanating with each 
new contact point. Theirs is not a tableau, cut-out figure 
of child surrounded by cut-out figure of cats. Theirs is a 
dynamic arrangement of spaces within spaces, dialogues re­
corded by the camera's click. 
We, like that child and cats, exist in relationship to 
each other because our existence is a social one. Placed in 
a building called School with three hundred other people, in 
a room called Homeroom with thirty other people, we are ini­
tially objects adrift in our own spaces, autonomous beings 
lined up in a row, present and accounted for. Space, in 
this case, is a background for our cut-out figures, that 
which separates us from one another. Within this space 
there is a thing called curriculum which also is divided 
into discrete, separate events. Room 311 and Mathematics 
precedes Room 302 and Language Arts and is followed by Room 
201 and Physical Science. Each discipline is self-contained. 
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Because there Is no crossover from mathematics to physical 
science, or from physical science to person, or from person 
to person, then there is no pattern. Subject matter does 
not necessarily have meaning within the context of human 
lives. People are not necessarily given places where they 
may reach each other in dialogue. The painting remains 
static, separate spaces jostling each other, but never con­
necting with each other. 
Life within such a classroom is life within an Andy 
Warhol painting. Monumentalizing the discardable objects 
of our culture, Warhol arranges them systematically, each 
coke bottle tucked neatly in its cube, standing next to the 
same coke bottle tucked neatly in its cube. It is as if 
this repetition upon repetition signifies the boring situa­
tion life has become. "And how is the Bald Soprani"asks one 
person in Ionesco's play. The reply is, "She always wears 
her hair in the same style."1 
The Mixing Machine - Reflection #2 
Space in tableau is but background, that which sepa­
rates us one from another. In the mixing machine, space is 
the canvas onto which one thousand people are shoved, 
pushed, and mixed. 
The function of a mixing machine is to blend in the 
Êugene Ionesco, The Bald Soprano, in Pour Plays. 
trans. Donald M. Allen (New Yorki Grove Press, 195o), p. 37. 
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random and diverse elements and whip them into a whole. 
Flour and milk are ingredients for a cake. To be cake, how­
ever, they must resemble something other than flour and 
milk. Children, big and little, slow and fast, are ingredi­
ents for a school. To be a school, however, they must re­
semble something other than autonomous children. So, we 
erect gateposts and signs, SAT, CAT, contracts, credits, and 
we space them out over a twelve-year span, indicating which 
must be mastered when. Fast and slow, Hispanic and Low 
Country, all must make way for these fences. It is as if 
by their sheer numbers, these rules of order can convince 
us that this is the way the world is. 
Space thus gets pushed aside as more people enter and 
more gateposts are erected. The figures, unable to retain 
their integrity, spill across the page, elbows butting into 
one another, legs and arms at sharp angles, overlapping 
each other's vision. The noise is indiscriminate sounds 
bombarding our ears. If the subjective child exists at all, 
it seems to be by accident. As in a Pollock painting, the 
original red of our lives peeps through the layers upon 
layers of paint only by the fate that happened to miss that 
spot. 
The tableau, therefore, becomes Reginald Marsh's "The 
Bowl." Space is so filled with forms that there is no dif­
ferentiation among those forms. The leg of one person 
seems to belong to the arm of another* It is as if we are 
171 
on this merry-go-round that someone mechanically wound up 
and that keeps spinning and spinning. We don't know where 
one person begins and another ends. Our only hope is that 
soon we will tumble off, the diploma will be awarded, and 
then we can collect our lives and proceed. 
In the tableau we couldn't reach across space and bring 
each other in. In the mixing bowl, we can't hold each other 
apart. So busy acquiring skills, taking the spider web 
apart, piece by piece, and then putting it back together 
with no pieces left over, we have no time or place to deal 
with complexities, equity, justice, the spinning of our own 
webs. 
Intersections - Reflection #3 
Space then is the substance through which we move. 
Consisting of objects and people and the spaces between 
those objects and people, it both defines (outlines) us and 
we use it to define (diagram) ourselves in relation to 
others. Although we can diagram the physical structure of 
the building in which we are housed to include open spaces 
for interaction, closed spaces for contemplation, these 
structures will be but extensions of the invisible green 
walls that presently surround us unless we somehow also 
change the spaces of our mind sets. Although we all pass 
through the world, we see it and know it in a special kind 
of way. Because perceiving also involves thinking, reason­
ing also involves intuition, and observation also involves 
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invention,1 we singularly choreograph our moves. Although 
we may all learn to volley and lob, the dynamics of the in­
teraction require something over and above that volley and 
lob. They require a moment-to-moment working out of our 
being together. They require a mind set over and above the 
stage set. 
Space, in this sense, is space to imagine, to remember, 
to do without failing, to stand apart as well as together. 
It is space that allows for validity and incompleteness. 
It is space that does not make things perfectly clear nor 
builds a tutelage system, but a discovery system in the 
sense that Jerome Bruner talks about it. To discover is to 
put what is known together in a new way, to re-negotiate 
the universe.̂  it is space where we are enabled to trans­
late experience as movement within the context of our own 
lives. It is space in which the human being is free to deli­
berate and choose. 
Space as attitude is seen in the work of the sculptor 
Sol Lewitt. Lewitt's latest work at the Whitney Museum con­
sists of four black walls onto which are attached white 
stakes in a spoke-like pattern. Each wall demands a differ­
ent number of nuclei. The length of the spokes may vary but 
iRudolf Arnheim, Toward a Psychology of Art, p. 5« 
2Jerome S. Bruner, "The Act of Discovery,M in Concepts 
in Art and Education. ̂ 1. George Pappas (New Yorki MacMillan 
Company, 1970), pp. 91-92. 
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each must, at some point, intersect the spokes radiating 
from another nuclei. The sculpture itself, however, is not 
assembled by Lewitt. Rather, for $60,000 Lewitt sends the 
directions for assembly. These directions, printed on plain 
white notepaper, resemble a math puzzle more than an art 
work. They state only the number of axes for each wall and 
the intersecting requirements. Thus, the art work has sys­
tem, is random, denies color, but beyond that is not a crea­
tion of the artist. Rather, it is a creation of the person 
making the art work, in this case, the curators of the 
Whitney Museum. Lewitt*s work, rather than being a fraud, 
seems to be saying that given certain conditions, it is we 
who must make our own spaces, draw our own connections, make 
our own implications. The world is neither closed nor open. 
It is simply available for our direction. 
What Lewitt thrusts into space is an attitude. He 
turns the kaleidoscope on what we think is natural (art 
works are completed by artists) and draws us into a new 
metaphor, the metaphor of life as presence. Setting up 
problems, offering no clear-cut solutions, the relevant 
questions are no longer what*s going to happen next, what 
are the causes and effects? Rather, the questions are what 
is happening nowi what do we do about being here and now?̂  
•̂Martin Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd (Garden City, 
New York* Doubleday & Company? Anchor Books, 1961), p. 205. 
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For Lewitt, the human being exists as something other than 
dimension. He exists also as spirit, a presence that must 
constantly confront life head on. To fee present is to exam­
ine the quality of that life. 
In Lewitt*s sense, space is not something to be dis­
placed or used, but something to be known. It is primary. 
It is the reverence of now, this time and this place. As 
such, its texture is variegated. At once real and not real 
(we sit at a desk and walk among Athenian ruins simultaneous­
ly) , at once dreamscape and landscape (we participate in the 
dance but the configurations are always in our head), space 
is the meeting place for worlds within and without. It is 
as if we hold within our heads one set of circumstances and 
within our physical living another and neither will work 
without the other, without the joining of man and place. To 
dream is to see the land from which the dream came. To be 
real is to admit to the mystery that directs that reality, 
the inner voice that places one foot in front of another, 
the impulse that tells the hand to write and then is able to 
read that writing. Time and space are both where we are 
and the counterpoint to where we are. 
Magic? Perhaps it is. To look at space and time from 
the subjective point of view is to look at the open spaces 
in the framework we have so effectively erected around our­
selves. Therefore, this looking may be neither understand­
able nor communicative, but that does not mean we can 
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banish it from our experience. Rather, we must include it 
in our experience. Only then will we be able to, as Tom 
Bobbins says, free ourselves from "the hypnotic hysteria of 
the mechanical, the numbing torpor of the electronic . . . 
and to devaluate the myth of progress."1 
Thirty bodies to a room, each one an axis, making his 
own space, drawing his own diagrams, cementing his own rela­
tionships. Space is but where we live. The way it is 
shaped speaks to the way we live. 
Mary Margaret reaches across to her three cats, two 
alive and one stuffed. Wink drapes her tail across Po, 
four whiskers stick up from Dumpy, and Mary Margaret sets 
about her task of re-arranging them. Somehow she doesn't 
know that cats aren't to be arranged, at least not the real 
variety. So, she shuffles them around, one in a corner, two 
on the radiator, and somehow they too seem content with this 
arrangement. It is as if they would not destroy the fairy 
talesi that square pegs will go in round holes, that cats 
will sit as arranged, and that she will be the director of 
her own spaces. May that always be so. 
Our characters stand on stage, visible, evident, fig­
ures whose shadows reach out and intersect. Their dance has 
begun, the configurations emerge. All that is left are 
words with which to speak. 
J-Still Life With Woodpecker (New Yorki Bantam Books, 
1980), p. 229. 
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CHAPTER XI 
THE LANGUAGE OF DIALOGUE 
Man then is spirit who reaches out to make sense out 
of his world and his position in that world. At the same 
time he directs and qualifies the experiences of the world, 
he stands in relationship to that landscape from which he 
comes. Reaching forth to perceive ways of being, there is 
always the reality against which those perceptions must be 
tested. We do not exist as beings over against the world 
but as beings in the world. Thus, time is both something 
that we are in, a reality, and something that is made visi­
ble through us. We move through time and space but qualify 
that time and space by our presence. 
Thus, what started out as a linear, easily comprehensi­
ble look at the works of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, as they 
related to time and space, has become progressively circular, 
compounding, paradoxical. At times it is as if the contra­
indication cannot be explained, its code cannot be broken. 
And perhaps that is the problem. I'm trying to lay out flat 
that which should not be laid flat. I'm trying to break in­
to discrete parts that which is more than the sum of its 
parts. If how we go about learning-is inseparable 
from what we learn, then to speak of diagonals is to speak 
in diagonals, language that binds man-thought with the 
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phenomenon of the world.*• 
Language is the way we make the world visible; it is 
the way we share our images of that world. Struggling to 
understand the nature of the world and ourselves in it, we 
mark off beginnings and endings to the flow that surrounds 
us. We integrate impressions of events—sight, touch, feel, 
and context—until, ultimately, the event itself, the conno­
tations and denotations are distilled into a single word, a 
single symbol that integrates all of our past memories of 
the experience. Thus, what was previously a vague impres­
sion is now concrete, available for contemplation and dis­
cussion. 
Making the world visible is, in a sense, putting a 
frame around it so that through the frame it has form and 
meaning. Mary Margaret and her three cats are tableau I 
have extracted from the tableaux that daily surround my 
life. Because I have framed these events, they are no 
longer indiscriminate pieces of furniture, objects that 
exist in a jumbled but close proximity to my existence. 
Mary Margaret and cats are a tableau, an arrangement that 
has form and meaning. The arrangement is theirs. The in­
terpretation is mine. Thus, in the intersection where their 
presence meets my presence, there is decision, judgment, 
evaluation, and integrity. There is meaning. 
Ŝewell, The Human Metaphor, p. 25. 
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Meaning therefore is not confined to our interpretation 
alone. At the same time language makes the world visible, 
it also makes it portable,1 available for consideration 
again and again. Because we have named the events of the 
world, we can remember them and we can also anticipate them 
in the future. Mary Margaret and cats are tableau from my 
past. At the time of their event, they were ignored. At 
the time of now, I have chosen to interpret them in a certain 
way. In the time of the future, I will think of them in a 
different way. The tableau itself is portable. It brings 
meaning to many different situations of my life. Thus, man 
both imparts meaning to the world and the world reveals it­
self as meaningful to man. 
The form that our imagery therefore takes, whether it 
be dance, painting, or the verbal language about which I 
talk is not a form which is apart from life, over and 
against it, but a form which derives out of life. The 
image has its own integrity and, at the same time, demands 
our presence, our awareness, for its completion. It is as 
if five people read Michael Polanyi's Meaning and interpret 
it five different ways in accordance with the individual cir­
cumstances they bring to his image. At the same time, 
underlying those interpretations are the common themes that 
exist in the imagei personal knowing, freedom, responsibility. 
M̂ichael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago» 
University of Chicago Press, 1975), P« 101. 
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The image has therefore translated what the world is. 
Being neither established nor fully comprehensible, it is 
instead open for negotiation.1 Because language admits many 
metaphors existing side by side, the behaviorist metaphor 
is no less vivid than the humanist metaphor. Both derive 
out of life and indicate a particular way of interaction 
with that life. Therefore, to judge those metaphors, we 
must do so within the context of that life. That is, we 
must evaluate which metaphor and accompanying language sys­
tem we deem appropriate to the way we wish to live. 
Wayne Booth has spoken to this evaluative process in 
his work "Metaphor as Rhetoric." Booth contends that speech 
is the way we call attention to our beliefs. Through speech, 
we intend to persuade. To the extent that we are able to 
persuade, we are able to change indi­
viduals and thus cultures. Therefore, to speak indicates 
we have a personal stake in the welfare of others. However, 
one figure of speech, one metaphor, can be proven no more 
right than any other metaphor. Each metaphor may contradict 
the other but cannot annihilate it. The basis, therefore, 
on which these metaphors are to be judged is whether they 
diminish or enlarge us. Because all metaphors contain with­
in them this ethical implication, then to criticize them is 
R̂ichard Schiff, "Art and Life* A Metaphoric Relation­
ship," in On Metaphor, ed. Sheldon Sacks (Chicagoi Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 105. 
180 
to look at what they have to say about being human. "The 
quality of any culture is in large part the quality of the 
metaphorists that it creates and sustains. 
If, therefore, man is spirit, then the metaphors we 
choose to describe that roan, as well as the language sys­
tems we deem appropriate to those metaphors, must be kept 
open, visible, and portable if life itself is to be open, 
visible, and portable. Because the spirit refuses to be 
categorized by any one system of thought, then truth and 
meaning in the spiritual mode are contextual, embedded in 
the world and the people of that world. Also, because the 
language we use is inevitably tied to the way we perceive 
and move through the world,2 then the words we use to de­
scribe that spirit must also be contextual. Capable of con­
tinual redefinition and redetermination, these words must, 
as Maxine Greene says, be protean. Both fitting and fer­
tile, flexible and complete, they must be words that admit 
to many interpretations and, at the same time, demand that 
those interpretations be evaluated within the context that 
they are shared words. Both vivid and imaginative, protean 
language is language that reveals our artist-making capaci­
ties, our ability to make aesthetic judgments. It is also 
Iwayne C. Booth, "Metaphor as Rhetoric," in On Meta­
phor, ed. Sheldon Sacks (Chicagot University of Chicago 
Press, 1979), pp. ̂ 9-70. 
2Polanyi, Meaning, p. 121. 
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language that binds us one to another, that allows us to 
share our images. Such language is the language of dialogue. 
The use of open, interpretative language allows us to 
have open, interpretative mind sets. If, however, the lan­
guage and mind are set, given no interpretations to consider, 
we forget our interpretative capacities. Given no history 
of associations, we forget our history, our cultural heri­
tage. Given no context in which to operate, we have nothing 
on which to reflect, to criticize. Void of interpretation, 
history, and context, we are separate, one from another, 
particles of matter temporarily caught "by time and space. 
The essential character of self is process. To imagine 
is to participate in dreams and visions. To do metaphors 
and myths is to share the dreams. The world as metaphor is 
revealed through metaphor. 
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CHAPTER XII 
FORD ISLAND* AGAIN 
In the thirtieth year of my life, I lived on the 
island called Oahu in the chain of islands called Hawaii. 
Because that island existed as both a time and a place, it 
had direction and continuity. It could be located in a his­
tory of things. Tucked somewhere between Alabama and the 
certainty that I knew what I was doing and South Carolina 
and the despair at what I seemed to be doing, Ford Island 
was indicative of my growing disillusionment with the pro­
cess we call schooling. Because I have held it apart, iso­
lated it from the irrelevancies and accidents of my life, I 
have been able to examine its circumstances and find patterns 
and orders which exist there. Through its continuity and 
direction, I have been able to trace the progression of my 
education. And so that should be it, a finished landscape, 
done with, the way a painting or book is done with, finally. 
But that it were. 
To categorize experience is different from having expe­
rience reach out from the past and attach itself to the 
present, demanding attention, continual re-evaluations, 
never dismissal. Ford Island will not be dismissed. In 
spite of the time and place which have now passed, it per­
sists. Like its inhabitants who felt neither free to leave 
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nor free to stay, it exists as unfinished canvas. Its in­
completeness takes hold of my imagination and demands under­
standing through that imagination. Ford Island is both 
reminder and possibility. 
The reminder is always of the figures, seated on the 
porch, half leaning forward as if to rise, heads turned in 
expectancy as if the ferry will soon come and, at the same 
time, hands, legs, and feet trailing off behind them to be­
come part of the bulk of the sculpture from which they have 
yet emerged. They are I, the silhouette moving through 
Chapel Hill, Berlin, Alabama, casting no shadows, and seeing 
in return no reflections. 
The possibility is in the opaque shafts of light that 
surround the canvas, the edges expectant, not yet defined. 
The USS Arizona that lies submerged three hundred feet off 
shore, the satellite that is tucked away in the quonset hut 
two hundred yards back down the runway, each radiate a 
history of things, people, and places that are not unlike 
the history of all things, people, and places. There are 
connections here that have yet to be made, concepts of edu­
cation that have yet to be realized, events that need only 
the imagination to be made visible. Without the actor there 
is no reason for a script. Without a script there is no 
need for the actors. 
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CHAPTER XIII 
REHEARSALS 
To believe that man constantly invents and re-invents 
himself is to defy endings. The desire to tie it up into a 
neat package, correctly positioned bow on top, is always 
there. However, there is something about that bow. Like 
the ribbon Mary Margaret wears in her hair, it is always 
slightly askew, wisps of hair escaping. Like Rembrandt's 
"Girl With Watering Can," she cannot stand still and neither 
can I. Themes keep escaping from what I have written, 
images not traced far enough, kaleidoscopes demanding that 
I go back and rebuild, that I expand like the ripples sent 
out from a pebble dropped. Movement is always the possibi­
lity. Rehearsal is always the performance. And so I go on, 
picking up the threads, re-working the designs, living in 
the fork of the road, which itself requires and brings the 
most illumination. We cannot hold the world still. We can 
but illuminate it for a moment. 
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